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INTRODUCTION 
The country’s collective patience for coddling private institu-
tions of higher education is waning. At the local level, there is an 
effort afoot to challenge the tax-exempt status of Princeton Univer-
sity.1 At the state level, legislators in Massachusetts and Connecticut 
have suggested imposing taxes that would target Harvard University 
and Yale University.2 At the federal level, a number of proposals 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. 
 1 See Elise Young, Princeton’s Neighbors Say to Heck With Freebies—We 
Want Cash, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-05-02/princeton-s-neighbors-say-to-heck-with-freebies-we-
want-cash (noting a challenge to the tax-exempt status of Princeton University, 
and also noting rhetoric from mayors in Boston, Chicago, and New Orleans aimed 
at collecting revenue from local private universities). 
 2 See, e.g., Peter Schworm & Matt Viser, Lawmakers Target $1B Endow-
ments, BOSTON.COM (May 8, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massa-
chusetts/articles/2008/05/08/lawmakers_target_1b_endowments/ (reporting on 
consideration by the Massachusetts legislature of a plan to impose a 2.5% tax on 
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have been floated that would impact the tax treatment of universities 
and their endowments, including imposing an excise tax on endow-
ment income.3 
In this paper, I will add my voice to the chorus of those who 
                                                                                                             
endowments in excess of $1 billion, which would have affected not merely Har-
vard University, but also Amherst College, Boston College, Boston University, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Smith College, Tufts University, Welles-
ley College, and Williams College); Michelle Liu, State Aims to Tax University 
Endowment, YALE DAILY NEWS (March 23, 2016), http://yaledailyn-
ews.com/blog/2016/03/23/state-aims-to-tax-university-endowment/ (reporting on 
two bills introduced in Connecticut: S.B. 413, which would tax private university 
endowments worth over $10 billion, and S.B. 414, which would increase the 
amount of private university property subject to local property tax). 
 3 Although no legislation resulted, in 2008, the Senate Finance Committee 
considered imposing a 5% annual spending requirement on university endow-
ments. See Alex Bloom, Iowa Senator Defends Inquiry, 5 Percent Spending Min-
imum, CBS NEWS (March 12, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iowa-sena-
tor-defends-inquiry-5-percent-spending-minimum/. Per Senator Chuck Grassley 
(R-Iowa), the reason for the proposal was that “Tuition has gone up, college pres-
idents’ salaries have gone up, and endowments continue to go up and up . . . .It’s 
fair to ask whether a college kid should have to wash dishes in the dining hall to 
pay his tuition when his college has a billion dollars in the bank.” See Baucus, 
Grassley Write to 136 Colleges, Seek Details of Endowment Pay-Outs, Student 
Aid, U.S. S. COMM. FIN. (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.finance.senate.gov/re-
lease/baucus-grassley-write-to-136-colleges-seek-details-of-endowment-pay-
outs-student-aid (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Then, in 2014, House Representative Dave Camp (R-Michigan) included as part 
of his comprehensive tax overhaul plan the imposition of a 1% excise tax on the 
net investment income of schools with endowment assets of at least $100,000 per 
full-time student. See, e.g., Janet Lorin & Lauren Streib, House Panel Questions 
College Endowment Spending, Tax Benefits, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2015, 6:32 PM) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-07/house-panel-questions-
college-endowment-spending-tax-benefits; Christine Y. Cahill & Amna H. 
Hashmi, Tax Reform Could Cost Harvard Millions, Though Passage Unlikely, 
THE HARV. CRIMSON (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/
4/3/tax-reform-cost-endowment/. 
Most recently, in 2016, House Representative Tom Reed (R-New York) resur-
rected Senator Grassley’s 2008 efforts by proposing that university endowments 
worth over $1 billion devote 25% of their annual endowment income to financial 
aid or risk losing the university’s tax-exempt status. See Janet Lorin, Richest U.S. 
Schools Could Lose Tax Status in Endowment Proposal, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 
2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-08/richest-
u-s-schools-could-lose-tax-status-in-endowment-proposal. This proposal would 
currently affect 92 institutions. See id. Given the state of gridlock in Washington, 
D.C., chances of enactment are currently at best remote. 
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would change the rules of federal taxation as applied to institutions 
of higher education. But rather than focus on the taxation of such 
institutions directly, I will instead focus on the propriety of granting 
such institutions the ability to receive gifts that are tax-deductible by 
the donor. I argue that in the specific and limited context of gifts 
made to university endowments, an adequate defense for providing 
the tax preference of a charitable contribution deduction is lacking. 
I. TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
In a world in which most activities are not taxed, the power to 
tax is surely “the power to destroy.”4 Conversely, in a world in 
which most activities are taxed, the willingness to forego full taxa-
tion, whether by granting a tax deduction to persons funding an ac-
tivity,5 by granting a tax exemption to the actual conduct of the ac-
tivity,6 or perhaps by granting both,7 is an exercise of the power to 
establish any activity that is not fully taxed.8 The reason is that when 
the federal government grants an activity the privilege to receive 
tax-advantaged funding (e.g., by way of allowing it to receive tax-
deductible charitable contributions)9 and/or grants to those persons 
who conduct the activity the privilege to conduct their activity in a 
                                                                                                             
 4 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819). 
 5 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (West 2014) (codified as 26 U.S.C. 
§ 170(a)(1)) (allowing federal income tax deductions to taxpayers who contribute 
to charitable organizations). 
 6 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2014) (codified as 26 U.S.C. 
§ 501(c)(3)) (exempting charitable and religious organizations from federal in-
come tax). 
 7 Taken together, I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1) and 501(c)(3) provide both tax-deduct-
ible contributions and tax-exempt “income” for certain non-profit organizations. 
See supra notes 5–6. 
 8 See Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 994 (1999) (“[G]ranting a taxpayer an exemption from a 
tax that would otherwise accrue (i.e., from the ‘normative tax’) is the same—in 
purpose and in effect—as collecting that tax and giving the taxpayer a direct sub-
sidy.”) (internal parentheses in original). But cf. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 
397 U.S. 664, 672 (1969) (“The legislative purpose of a property tax exemption 
is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither sponsorship 
nor hostility.”). 
 9 See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1)). 
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tax-exempt manner,10 it cedes to such activity a part of what would 
otherwise be its general revenue.11 
As is the case with any “tax expenditure,” the federal govern-
ment could have used the revenue lost to the establishment of the 
favored activity to provide additional benefits to society.12 Or if suf-
ficient benefits were already being provided, the federal government 
could have defrayed a part of the cost of such benefits and thus ulti-
mately lowered the tax burdens imposed on persons conducting less 
favored activities.13 Phrased somewhat more provocatively, we all 
pay for these favored activities—because of them, we either receive 
fewer government benefits or pay higher taxes than we otherwise 
would.14 Given this reality, the federal government ought to bear a 
                                                                                                             
 10 See I.R.C. § 501(a) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 501(a)). 
 11 See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 1155, 1158 (1988) (“[A] preferential tax provision operates in two steps: first 
the taxpayer pays the government the [tax] called for . . . in the absence of the 
preferential provision, and then the government gives the taxpayer a government 
grant or subsidy . . . .[T]he government makes the subsidy payment by reducing 
the taxpayer’s tax liability.”). See also STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. 
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985) (“Put differently, whenever govern-
ment decides to grant monetary assistance to an activity or group, it may choose 
from a wide range of methods, such as . . . [reducing] the tax liability otherwise 
applicable by adopting a special exclusion, deduction, or the like for the favored 
activity or group.”). 
 12 See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Gov-
ernment Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 705, 713 (1970) (“We can assume it is understood that each incentive 
must serve purposes which the nation wants to achieve and is willing to finance, 
rather than let the marketplace determine the extent to which the result will ob-
tain.”). 
 13 Confirmation of this possibility can be found in the fact that the Office of 
Management and Budget annually publishes a “tax expenditure” budget to ac-
company the publication of the Budget of the U.S. Government. See generally, 
e.g., OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016 219–64 (2015). See also NORTON FRANCIS ET 
AL., TAX POL’Y CTR., What are tax expenditures and how are they structured?, in 
THE TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK: A CITIZENS’ GUIDE TO THE TAX SYSTEM AND 
TAX POLICY available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/back-
ground/expenditures/budget.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2017). 
 14 See, e.g., David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a 
Net Income Tax System, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1254 (2011) (“[T]he 
difference between tax subsidies and direct spending is illusory. The government 
can influence the allocation and distribution of societal resources through either 
avenue, but the use of a tax subsidy instead of direct spending creates an illusion 
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heavy burden to justify granting the privileges of tax-deductible 
funding and/or tax-exempt operations to any activity.15 
The only truly satisfactory justification for granting these privi-
leges to any particular activity is that such grant does not in fact 
impose a burden on the remainder of society.16 That prerequisite is 
most easily and obviously satisfied if the federal government would, 
in the absence of such a grant, itself provide the service that the tax-
favored activity provides, though presumably not as efficiently.17 At 
least in the case of the grant of tax preferences to private universi-
ties, this sounds like a plausible justification.18 In many, even most, 
                                                                                                             
of smaller government from a fiscal perspective because the tax subsidy appears 
to reduce taxes and spending. Although an illusion, the appearance affects recep-
tion and helps to explain the popularity of various tax programs.”). 
 15 Cf. Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 
1974) (“An exemption is an exception to the norm of taxation. An organization 
which seeks to obtain tax exempt status, therefore, bears a heavy burden to prove 
that it satisfies all the requirements of the exemption statute.”). 
 16 But see, e.g., Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-Time Vs. Periodic: 
An Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L. REV. 305, 308 
n.16 (1994) (“[T]ax incentives create[] undue tax complexity . . . . [Also,] . . . 
those taxpayers who [are] in the highest tax bracket receive[] the greatest tax re-
duction from the more common tax incentive provisions that operate[] through 
exemptions or deductions . . . .”). 
 17 See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C.L. REV. 
501, 577 (1990) (“Accordingly, the result of their collective decision-making will 
be to provide public goods at the level of quality and quantity that satisfies the 
demands of the median voter. Voters who prefer different levels, whether higher 
or lower, will thus be left dissatisfied with governmental provision of public 
goods.”). 
 18 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Or-
ganizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 66 (1981) (“A . . . 
common view of the exemption is [as] a means of subsidizing particular ser-
vices—such as health care, education, research, and aid to the poor—that non-
profit organizations often provide . . . that otherwise would have to be provided 
by the government . . . .”). See also Henry Hansmann, Professor of L., Yale Law 
Sch., Why Are Colleges and Universities Exempt from Taxes?, Essay Prepared for 
the National Center for Philanthropy and the Law’s 25th Annual Conference: 
“Colleges and Universities: Legal Issues in the Halls of Ivy” 4–11 (Oct. 24–25, 
2013) (transcript available in the New York University School of Law Library) 
(discussing other rationales for subsidizing higher education and briefly mention-
ing the United States’s experimentation with for-profit higher education). 
2017] CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 707 
 
developed countries, the public sector is the almost exclusive pro-
vider of higher education.19 We too could follow those countries’ 
collective lead and have the federal government impose additional 
taxes to fund the provision of higher education.20 Indeed, we do fol-
low this lead to a significant extent, albeit mostly indirectly: the fed-
eral government provides students with financial assistance, univer-
sities with research grants and other revenue streams, and states with 
funding that helps them to establish and maintain public universi-
ties.21 
Why do we tolerate the alternative of private universities fi-
nanced largely by tax preferences? Why do we allow taxpayers to 
divert what would otherwise be public funds to what is essentially 
the private sector, so long as that sector uses such funds to provide 
what are essentially public services? Before examining the reasons 
that have been identified to justify this use of tax preferences to en-
courage the growth of a “private” industry to satisfy a public goal, I 
want to remind the reader why we in the United States favor such 
hybrid structures for organizing industries: we prefer limited gov-
ernment,22 we believe that the private sector can do almost anything 
                                                                                                             
 19 See, e.g., Andrew Kelly, America’s High-Risk, High-Reward Higher Edu-
cation System, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2015, 12:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
akelly/2015/03/01/americas-high-risk-high-reward-higher-education-system/2/ 
(“Higher education [in countries other than the United States] is free or extremely 
low-cost, but access to academic degree programs at top universities is heavily 
rationed.”). 
 20 See id. 
 21 Financial assistance to students may or may not be based on need. See, e.g., 
20 U.S.C. § 1070a(a)(1) (West 2014) (providing Pell grants to eligible students). 
Federal education funding to states encourages states to provide higher education 
services through state-established public universities. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 49-9-102(b)(1)–(2) (West 2014) (accepting federal funding for higher educa-
tion). The federal government also provides higher education services directly to 
a very limited extent at West Point and other military academies. See, e.g., 10 
U.S.C. § 2161 (West 2014) (describing schools run by the Department of De-
fense). 
 22 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Remain Divided on Preference for 
Gov’t Activity, GALLUP (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/177422/
americans-remain-divided-preference-gov-activity.aspx (“54% of Americans say 
the government is ‘trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals 
and businesses.’”). 
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better than the public sector,23 and we treat the competitive market 
as a holy grail.24 All else being equal, we believe that private uni-
versities will necessarily provide “better” educational services than 
public universities.25 
                                                                                                             
 23 See, e.g., Chris Edwards, Government Infrastructure Is Inefficient Every-
where, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Mar. 19, 2014, 5:23 PM), 
http://www.cato.org/blog/government-infrastructure-inefficient-everywhere (us-
ing government dam projects as an egregious example of government cost over-
runs); Millennials Think Government is Inefficient, Abuses its Power, and Sup-
ports Cronyism, REASON.COM (July 10, 2014, 8:02 AM), http://reason.com/
poll/2014/07/10/reason-rupe-2014-millennial-survey (arguing that millennials 
see the government as inefficient and wasteful though they support government 
action in several specific areas). But see BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LAB., USDL-16-2255, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION—
SEPTEMBER 2016 1 (Dec. 8, 2016), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.re-
lease/pdf/ecec.pdf (showing that the hourly cost to employers for compensating 
government workers was merely $13.66 more than workers in the private sector); 
Joseph Slater & Elijah Welenc, Are Public-Sector Employees “Overpaid” Rela-
tive to Private-Sector Employees? An Overview of the Studies, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 
533, 541–42 (2013) (noting that studies agree that higher-level public employees 
are paid less than their private-sector counterparts, whereas as lower-level public 
employees tend to be paid a little more). 
 24 Compare Jonathan Haidt, Capitalism As Our Greatest Hope, THE WORLD 
POST (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-
haidt/capitalism-as-our-greates_b_3600792.html (“I think in the long run our 
greatest hope is capitalism . . . . What I’m hoping is that we as Americans, and 
people in other countries, too, can think more clearly about capitalism as the en-
gine of growth that lifts people out of poverty.”), with Robert Reich, The Myth of 
the ‘Free Market’ and How to Make the Economy Work for Us, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 16, 2013, 12:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/
free-market_b_3935173.html (“One of the most deceptive ideas continuously 
sounded by the Right (and its fathomless think tanks and media outlets) is that the 
‘free market’ is natural and inevitable, existing outside and beyond government.”) 
(internal parentheses in original). 
 25 See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Catching Up Is Hard To Do: Undergraduate Pres-
tige, Elite Graduate Programs, and the Earnings Premium 3 (Vanderbilt Univ. 
Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 14-23), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2473238 (finding that data demonstrates an earnings 
premium for male students who graduate from elite undergraduate institutions). 
But see Deborah L. Jacobs, Public or Private College. Is The Outcome Any Dif-
ferent?, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013, 8:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahl
jacobs/2013/10/02/public-or-private-college-is-the-outcome-any-different/ (ar-
guing that, given the rising costs of higher education, private education is not 
worth the additional money spent). 
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Yet, the mere coexistence of public and private universities be-
lies the proposition that private universities provide better educa-
tional services than public universities in any meaningful sense. For 
example, if private universities provided the same quality of educa-
tion, but did so more cheaply, one would expect public universities 
to be driven out of the market. Similarly, if they offered a higher 
quality of education, but at the same price, one would again expect 
public universities to be driven out of the market. So, assuming the 
market works,26 private universities must provide a different quality 
of education at a different price, with some consumers preferring 
one quality-price combination and others preferring the other. Of 
course, even if taxpayers understood that choice was the only thing 
that the grant of tax preferences to private universities was buying, 
support for such preferences would not necessarily evaporate.27 
Americans love choice.28 And in light of recent experiences, we 
could be forgiven for deeming the availability of merely for-profit 
                                                                                                             
 26 The market may not work for education considering the massive amount 
of direct and indirect government intervention. See George Leef, The Growing 
Potential of Free Market Education, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2012, 10:41 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/02/07/the-growing-potential-of-free-market
-education/; Valerie Strauss, Why the ‘Market Theory’ of Education Reform 
Doesn’t Work, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2012/10/12/why-the-market-theory-of-education-re-
form-doesnt-work/ (arguing that when parents are given an educational “free mar-
ket,” they actually do not prioritize educational quality when choosing a particular 
school for their children). 
 27 Cf. Arianna Prothero, Charters & Choice News Roundup: Unions vs. 
School Choice, EDUC. WEEK BLOGS: CHARTERS & CHOICE (Mar. 6, 2015, 10:29 
AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2015/03/charters_choice_
news_roundup_unions_vs_school_choice.html?print=1 (describing recent exper-
imentation with charter schools and school voucher programs at the state and local 
levels). 
 28 See, e.g., Art Markman, The Dark Side of Choice in America, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/art-markman-phd/dark-side-of-choice_b_888751.html (“A big part of our 
identity is the freedom of choice. The strong libertarian streak that runs through 
American politics reflects a don’t-tread-on-me spirit that has been part of our na-
tional identity since Revolutionary War times.”). 
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alternatives such as DeVry University or ITT Educational Services 
to represent insufficient choice.29 
II. THE THEORETICAL DEFENSE OF THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION 
DEDUCTION 
Legal commentators have proposed three rationales to justify the 
use of tax preferences to achieve public goals and, in particular, to 
justify the grant to certain institutions of the privilege to receive 
funding by way of tax-deductible contributions.30 One could apply 
each of these rationales to the goal of providing higher education (or 
to the lesser goal of multiplying choices in higher education).31 
First, such tax deductions encourage generosity and thus max-
imize the total amount of societal resources devoted to the pursuit 
                                                                                                             
 29 See DeVry University Historical Timeline, DEVRY UNIV., http://www.
devry.edu/community-network/our-heritage.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017) (de-
scribing how DeVry University is a for-profit university that features online and 
on-campus classes); Patricia Cohen, ITT Educational Services Closes Campuses, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/itt-ed-
ucational-services-closes-its-campuses.html (reporting on the shuttering of ITT 
Educational Services in the wake of poor educational performance). See also Alia 
Wong, The Downfall of For-Profit Colleges, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2015, 1:30 
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/02/the-downfall-of-
for-profit-colleges/385810/ (explaining how for-profit colleges and universities 
have come under intense federal scrutiny because of their poor performance). 
 30 See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incen-
tives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 
224 (2009) (proposing “three justifications for the [tax] deduction, each respond-
ing to a different information or incentive problem that is inherent in the pursuit 
of public goals”). Throughout this essay, I will treat the privilege of receiving tax-
deductible contributions as though it is necessarily coupled with the privilege of 
operating in a tax-exempt manner. In principle, such coupling is not necessary. 
After all, one could create a tax scheme in which contributions to private univer-
sities were not deductible but in which the operation of such universities were 
exempt from taxes. Likewise, one could conceive of the converse. Since such in-
termediate schemes have not been employed in our tax system, however, I will 
not dwell on them here. See supra notes 2–3 (reflecting various proposed plans 
by state and federal legislatures). 
 31 Cf. Mark J. Cowan, Taxing and Regulating College and University Endow-
ment Income: The Literature’s Perspective, 34 J.C. & U.L. 507, 534–37 (2008) 
(discussing tax subsidy rationales for the tax exemption of higher education). 
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of public goals.32 To illustrate this point, consider a pool of $100 
million of income that is federally taxable at a flat 30% marginal 
rate. This pool could conceivably consist of the last $100 earned by 
one million different people or the last $100 million earned by a sin-
gle billionaire; at this stage of the analysis, it makes no difference.33 
In the absence of contributions to private universities and any at-
tendant tax deductions, this pool generates $30 million of tax reve-
nue for the pursuit of public goals.34 If, however, contributions to 
private universities are tax-deductible, and if this deductibility en-
courages taxpayers to contribute 10% of the income pool to such 
universities, $37 million will be generated for the pursuit of public 
goals.35 True, the federal government loses control over how $3 mil-
lion is spent, but presumably the additional $7 million spent in ag-







No Deduction for 
Contributions 











$30 million $27 million 
Education 
Spending  
Controlled by  
Donors 
$0 $10 million 
 
                                                                                                             
 32 See generally Schizer, supra note 30, at 229 (explaining that tax incentives 
promote charitable giving in part because free riding encourages people to shift 
the cost of charities’ public benefits to others). 
 33 See id. But see infra Part III (discussing how the fact that large gifts to 
endowments are made by very wealthy individuals impacts whether the additional 
generosity rationale for tax-deductible higher education contributions makes 
sense). 
 34 That is, it generates 30% of $100 million. 
 35 In addition to the $10 million contribution, $27 million in taxes, or 30% of 
$90 million, will continue to be collected. 
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The arithmetic is more complicated if the income at issue is un-
realized capital gain that the taxpayers intend to realize.36 Suppose 
that such income is taxed at a uniform marginal rate of 15%. In that 
case, in the absence of any tax-deductible contribution, the federal 
government receives $15 million of tax revenue.37 However, due to 
the perverse operation of the tax code, if $10 million of the property 
is contributed to a private university, the federal government does 
not merely lose $1.5 million of tax revenue, but rather $4.5 million, 
since the amount of deemed realized capital gain declines to $90 
million while the full $10 million is allowed as an ordinary income 
deduction.38 Thus, as was the case with a cash gift, the amount gen-
erated for the pursuit of public goals increases (now from $15 mil-
lion to $20.5 million), even as the amount controlled by the federal 





No Deduction for 
Contributions 




used to Fund 
Education 
General Spending 
Controlled by Federal 
Government 
$15 million $10.5 million 
Education Spending 
Controlled by Donors 
$0 $10 million 
 
                                                                                                             
 36 See generally I.R.C. § 1222 (2012) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1222); I.R.C. 
§ 1(h) (West 2014) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)). 
 37 That is, it generates 15% of $100 million. 
 38 See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1)); 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.170A–1(a) (2015) (allowing an above-the-line deduction for “any charitable 
contribution”); 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A–1(c) (stating the amount of a contribution of 
property is the fair market value of the contributed property). Thus, if a 15% tax 
rate is applied to $90 million and a 30% tax rate is applied to a lost $10 million, 
$10.5 million of net tax revenue results. Note that the favorable rules have some 
limitations. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (codified as 26 U.S.C. 
§ 170(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii)) (limiting contribution amounts for capital gain contribu-
tions to at least no more than 30% of the taxpayers adjusted gross income for any 
given year, with any excess available as a carryover for the next five years); I.R.C. 
§ 170(e) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 170(e)) (reducing contribution amounts for cap-
ital gain contributions by their short-term capital gain). 
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The second benefit alleged to follow from allowing tax-deduct-
ible contributions to private universities is that it enables the federal 
government to invest its resources in a manner that more closely re-
flects societal preferences.39 For example, in the first illustration 
above (Table 1.1), the federal government has effectively decided to 
spend $3 million of what would have been its general revenue on 
higher education, but has not engaged in the requisite due diligence 
that would enable it to devise an efficient strategy for directing such 
expenditure.40 By “piggybacking” its so-called “tax expenditure” 
onto the “investment” decisions of individual donors, each of whom 
it hopes is motivated to investigate the quality of the education that 
his or her contribution ultimately buys, the federal government can 
optimize the value of its own co-investment.41 Table 2.1 treats the 
federal government’s tax revenue loss from the contribution deduc-
tion as just such a targeted piggybacked tax-expenditure invest-
ment:\   
Table 2.1 
Grant of         
Federal Revenue 
to State to Fund 
Education
Deduction for    
Contributions 
used to Fund    
Education 
Non-Education Spending  
Controlled by Federal  
Government 
$27 million $27 million 
Education Spending  
Controlled by Federal  
Government 
$3 million $0 
Education Spending  
Delegated by Federal  
Government to Donors 
$0 $3 million42 
Education Spending  
Controlled by Donors 
$0 $7 million 
                                                                                                             
 39 See generally Schizer, supra note 30, at 229–30. 
 40 See supra Table 1.1. 
 41 See Schizer, supra note 30, at 229 (“[S]ubsidized charity can serve as a 
means for identifying and reflecting popular preferences, since the government 
invests money only when individual donors do so as well.”). 
 42 The federal government would spend this money indirectly by allowing 
taxpayers a deduction on their federal income tax for amounts they contribute to 
universities. 
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The third alleged benefit, which is the ex-post counterpart to the 
second, is that private donors may be better able than the federal 
government to monitor the quality of educational services they 
fund.43 That is, private donors are not only likely to investigate po-
tential donee universities before making their contributions, but are 
also likely to monitor them after making their contributions.44 
Before examining these purported benefits more closely, I 
should modify Table 2.1 to more accurately reflect how “direct” 
funding for higher education operates under our federal system. To 
wit, the federal government delegates to states effectively all of the 
implementation for providing such education.45 Once the decision 
to delegate has been made, the federal government has essentially 
two ways to proceed. First, the federal government could make an 
outright grant to one or more states to fund their provision of higher 
education.46 In the first column of Table 2.2 below, the federal gov-
ernment takes the $3 million of its general tax revenue that it has 
decided to devote to higher education and gives it to one or more 
states. 
Second, the federal government could encourage states to exer-
cise their own taxing powers to fund state universities by making the 
                                                                                                             
 43 See Schizer, supra note 30, at 230 (“[A]gents are tempted to shirk or to 
behave self-interestedly, and principals may not have enough information to know 
they are doing so. ‘Implementation error’ is . . . the welfare costs from poor or 
costly administration. Minimizing this . . . error is a third objective in designing a 
subsidy for charitable contributions.”). 
 44 See id. at 256 (“Since they are contributing their own money, donors have 
the incentive to assess whether their gifts are having a positive impact. When the 
donor is capable of making a large contribution, moreover, she is likely to have 
influence with the nonprofit manager.”). 
 45 See 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (defining an “institution of higher education” 
eligible for federal funding as an educational institution “legally authorized within 
such State to provide a program of education beyond secondary education . . . .”). 
See also 34 C.F.R. § 600.4 (2015) (defining an “institution of higher education” 
as being “in a State” but offering only broad guidelines for federal funding eligi-
bility). 
 46 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1161y (2012) (allowing the Secretary of Education 
to grant federal funding to state educational agencies to pay for their administra-
tive expenses in participating in a Pell Grant demonstration program); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 694.1 (2016) (stating the Secretary of Education will establish an annual state 
grant for a state’s participation in the GEAR UP program). 
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taxes imposed by states for such purpose tax deductible at the fed-
eral level.47 In theory, states could use their taxing authority to fund 
any desired amount of higher education, and, in particular, could use 
it to generate the same $10 million that arose in Table 2.1 from the 
federal government’s tax preference granted to contributions.48 For 
example, suppose the federal government wanted to pursue this ap-
proach with respect to the $100 million income pool underlying my 
illustration.49 If the affected states reacted by imposing a state in-
come tax at a 10% flat rate on that income pool, and if the federal 
government allowed taxpayers to deduct their payment of that state 
income tax,50 then the income pool would again generate $37 mil-
lion for the pursuit of all public goals. The state governments would 
control $10 million, allocated to higher education, and the federal 
government would control the remaining $27 million. In this case, 
shown in the second column of Table 2.2 below, the federal govern-
ment’s tax expenditure would piggyback off the states’ direct ex-
penditures, rather than off private donors’ contributions. 
 
Table 2.2 
Grant of      
Federal       
Revenue to 
State to Fund 
Education
Deduction 
for State  
Income Tax 




used to Fund   
Education 
Non-Education     
Spending Con-
trolled by Federal  
Government 
$27 million $27 million $27 million 
                                                                                                             
 47 Cf. I.R.C. § 164 (2012) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 164) (allowing taxpayers 
who itemize their below-the-line deductions to deduct state and local property 
taxes and to opt between deducting state and local sales taxes or state and local 
income taxes). But no specific federal income tax deduction currently exists for 
the payment of state taxes that are specifically earmarked for state educational 
funding. In spite of this, states fund postsecondary education. See, e.g., COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-75-1001 (allocating funding for Colorado’s higher educa-
tion institutions out of Colorado’s general revenue). 
 48 See supra Table 2.1. 
 49 See supra Part II. 
 50 See I.R.C. § 164 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 164). 
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Education Spend-
ing Controlled by 
Federal  
Government 
$3 million51 $0 $0 
Education Spend-
ing Delegated by 
Federal Govern-
ment to States 
$0 $3 million52 $0 
Education Spend-
ing Controlled by 
States 
$0 $7 million $0 
Education Spend-
ing Delegated by 
Federal Govern-
ment to Donors 
$0 $0 $3 million53 
Education Spend-
ing Controlled by 
Donors 
$0 $0 $7 million 
 
Note that although the total amount spent on higher education is 
the same in the second and the third columns of Table 2.2, the two 
differ qualitatively. In the second column, where the federal govern-
ment grants to the states the incentive to fund higher education by 
means of federally tax deductible state income taxes, the entire $10 
million ultimately devoted to higher education is extracted from the 
citizenry by means of taxes rather than voluntary contributions and 
is spent on education based on bureaucratic choices rather than in-
dividual choices. On the plus side, both the taxes imposed and the 
bureaucratic choices made presumably significantly reflect local 
                                                                                                             
 51 This $3 million of federal funds is spent on higher education through a 
direct grant to the states. 
 52 The federal government spends this money indirectly through the states by 
allowing taxpayers a deduction on their federal income tax for amounts they pay 
toward their state taxes specifically earmarked for higher education. 
 53 See supra note 42 (“The federal government would spend this money indi-
rectly by allowing taxpayers a deduction on their federal income tax for amounts 
they contribute to universities.”). 
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(rather than merely national) educational preferences.54 Neverthe-
less, to the extent that a voluntary component of education funding 
is deemed to be a virtue,55 that virtue will have been lost. 
III. WHY THE THEORETICAL DEFENSE FAILS WHEN APPLIED TO 
GIFTS TOWARDS ENDOWMENTS 
Gifts to educational institutions tend to come in two flavors: 
smaller repeat gifts that become a revenue item in such institutions’ 
annual budgets and larger one-time gifts that become part of such 
institutions’ endowments.56 I will concede for the sake of argument 
that one can justify tax preferences for the former on the grounds 
proffered above.57 That is, the availability of a tax deduction for an-
nual contributions to universities could spur giving and thus increase 
the aggregate amount of funds devoted to higher education.58 More-
over, adding a private component to annual higher education fund-
ing could also lead to informational benefits, including more in-
formed investing and improved monitoring, since annual givers 
have the ability—and the incentive—to modify their giving strate-
gies in response to changing circumstances (such as, for example, a 
decline in the quality or quantity of educational services provided 
                                                                                                             
 54 See, e.g., Justin R. Long, Democratic Education and Local School Govern-
ance, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 401, 413–39 (2014) (reviewing several arguments 
in favor of local control for schools, including the notion that local control affords 
choosy parents a diversity of schooling options in a real estate marketplace). 
 55 See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 
VA. L. REV. 1393, 1409 (1988) (“Donors may prefer a system in which charities 
are underfunded, and they pay a disproportionate share of the cost, because of the 
pleasure (and influence) they get from a voluntary system.”) (internal parentheses 
in original). 
 56 See, e.g., How Endowments Work, EMORY UNIV. FIN. DIV., https://www.fi-
nance.emory.edu/home/accounting_svcs/Endowment%20and%20Investment/in-
dex_accounting_how_endowments_work.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017) (de-
scribing how a donor can give to Emory University by establishing an endow-
ment); Planned Gifts, EMORY UNIV. FIN. DIV., https://www.finance.emory.edu/
home/accounting_svcs/Endowment%20and%20Investment/index_account-
ing_planned_giving.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017) (describing common forms 
of gift-giving to Emory University other than by establishing an endowment). 
 57 See supra Part II. 
 58 See Schizer, supra note 30, at 229 (“[A] familiar rationale for subsidizing 
charitable contributions is to persuade donors to be more generous.”). 
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by a particular educational institution).59 But one cannot similarly 
justify the availability of a tax deduction for larger one-time gifts to 
endowments. 
To demonstrate this point, I need to make a slight modification 
to the previous illustration.60 So far, I imposed no particular struc-
ture on the initial $100 million income pool. Now, I will assume that 
such income pool is earned entirely by a very small number of very 
wealthy individuals. This assumption comports with the reality that 
gifts to endowments tend to be far fewer in number than annual gifts, 
but also tend to be much larger on a per-gift basis.61 In other words, 
endowments are funded primarily by the very wealthy. 
A gift to an educational endowment does not produce an imme-
diate expenditure on higher education.62 Rather, the endowment 
maintains control of the funds received, invests them as it sees fit, 
and annually distributes some generally fixed, relatively small per-
centage of its assets to its host institution.63 This arrangement is de-
signed to maximize the likelihood that the funds last in perpetuity.64 
It is only the annual distributions that actually fund higher educa-
tion.65 As a preliminary matter, this arrangement might lead one to 
                                                                                                             
 59 See id. at 229–30, 256 (“Since [donors] are contributing their own money, 
donors have the incentive to assess whether their gifts are having a positive im-
pact.”). 
 60 See supra Part II. 
 61 See, e.g., Kaitlin Mulhere, Deep-Pocket Donors, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 
28, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/28/2014-record-year-
higher-ed-donations (“The University of Texas at Austin . . . placed seventh 
[among schools of total funds raised in 2014] thanks to a nearly $217 million art 
gift that accounted for more than 40 percent of the university’s total.”). See also, 
e.g., Press Release, Council for Aid to Educ., Colleges and Universities Raise 
$37.45 Billion in 2014: Harvard Raises $1.16 Billion (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://cae.org/images/uploads/pdf/VSE-2014-Press-Release.pdf. 
 62 See, e.g., Albert Phung, How Do University Endowments Work?, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/06/universityendow-
ment.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2017) (“The sole intention of the endowment is to 
invest it . . . .”). 
 63 See, e.g., id. 
 64 See, e.g., How Endowments Work, supra note 56 (“[T]he University is un-
able to spend the principal of the endowment but it is able to spend all or a portion 
of the income that is generated through the investment of the gift.”). 
 65 See, e.g., Phung, supra note 62 (describing how donors can restrict how 
investment income is spent and how universities have freedom to make such de-
cisions in the absence of such restrictions). 
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ask: Is it even the case that a $10 million gift to a university endow-
ment in any relevant sense purchases $10 million in educational ex-
penditures? 
The answer is not necessarily. Importantly, any endowment re-
quires a bureaucratic infrastructure, including investment profes-
sionals, accountants, and the like.66 Such an infrastructure does not 
come cheap. For purposes of illustration, assume that the endow-
ment’s direct costs amount to 1% of assets annually.67 On top of 
these direct costs, the endowment is likely to hire outside managers, 
such as hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds, 
to manage a part of its assets.68 For purposes of illustration, assume 
that 20% of the endowment’s assets are managed in this manner.69 
                                                                                                             
 66 A number of educational institutions with large endowments have estab-
lished in-house “investment management companies” to manage their invest-
ments. See, e.g., HARVARD MGMT. CO., http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/investment-
management/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2017); STANFORD MGMT. CO., 
http://www.smc.stanford.edu/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017); YALE INV. OFF., 
http://investments.yale.edu/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017). 
 67 Cf. Memorandum from the Office of Fed. Relations, Harvard Univ., to The 
Honorable Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Finance, United States Sen-
ate, The Honorable Kevin Brady, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
United States House of Representatives, and The Honorable Peter Roskam, Chair-
man, Oversight Subcomm., House Comm. on Ways and Means, United States 
House of Representatives 9 (Mar. 31, 2016) available at http://www.har-
vard.edu/sites/default/files/content/20160401_harvard_congressional_report.pdf 
(in a letter to Congress defending the tax exempt status of Harvard University’s 
endowment, Harvard University President Drew Faust stated that the annual cost 
of Harvard Management Company, Inc., is around .75% of assets under manage-
ment, and noted further that such cost was well below the 2% external manage-
ment would generally cost). 
 68 Cf. JANE L. MENDILLO, HARVARD MGMT. CO., SEPTEMBER 2014 ANNUAL 
ENDOWMENT REPORT, MESSAGE FROM THE CEO 6 (2014) available at 
http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/docs/Final_Annual_Report_2014.pdf (in its Annual 
Endowment Report for FY 2014, the Harvard Management Company, Inc. esti-
mated that by managing its investments partially-internally (a so-called “hybrid” 
structure), Harvard University had saved approximately $2.0 billion between 
1994 and 2014, as compared to the cost of an entirely externally managed portfo-
lio). 
 69 Cf. HEDGE CLIPPERS, ENDANGERED ENDOWMENTS: HOW HEDGE FUNDS 
ARE BANKRUPTING HIGHER EDUCATION, HEDGE PAPERS NO. 25 (Feb. 7, 2016) 
available at http://hedgeclippers.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/HP25.pdf (es-
timating that over $100 billion out of $500 billion total university endowment 
funds were invested in hedge funds alone). Noted, however, that hedge funds are 
not the only type of externally managed fund. 
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And assume that the chosen hedge funds, private equity funds, and 
venture capital funds impose a 2-and-20 fee structure on the assets 
they manage, as is indeed standard industry practice: thus, 2% of 
assets plus 20% of profits remain with the managers of the various 
funds.70 Finally, assume that notwithstanding the heroic efforts of 
the many investment professionals, the endowment’s investments 
merely earn the fair expected return that reflects the risk of its in-
vestments.71 For purposes of illustration, I assume such return is 
10%. 
Table 3 illustrates the workings of these various fees in the year 
after the endowment receives its $10 million gift, subject to the ad-
ditional proviso that the endowment at the end of the year pays out 
4% to its initial assets to its host university:  
 
Table 3 
Assets Managed    
Directly
Assets Managed 
by Third Persons 






Direct Costs ($80,000)  
                                                                                                             
 70 See, e.g., Janet Lorin, Small Endowments Lose Money on Hedge Funds, 
Trailing Big Schools, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2016-02-08/small-endowments-lose-money-on-hedge-
funds-trailing-big-schools (hedge funds received $2.5 billion in fees from univer-
sity endowments in 2015, which amounted to over half of the total earnings from 
the endowments’ investments). Cf. Victor Fleischer, Stop Universities From 
Hoarding Money, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/08/19/opinion/stop-universities-from-hoarding-money.html (es-
timating that Harvard University spent $362 million and Yale University spent 
$480 million in 2014 on private equity management fees). 
 71 See BEN JOHNSON, MORNINGSTAR’S ACTIVE/PASSIVE BAROMETER: A 
NEW YARDSTICK FOR AN OLD DEBATE, MORNINGSTAR 1–2 (June 25, 2015), 
available at http://corporate.morningstar.com/US/documents/ResearchPapers/
MorningstarActive-PassiveBarometerJune2015.pdf (measuring “active manag-
ers’ success relative to the actual, net-of-fee performance of passive funds, rather 
than an index which isn’t investable” and finding “that actively managed funds 
have generally underperformed their passive counterparts, especially over longer 
time horizons, and experienced higher mortality rates . . . .”). 
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2% Fund Management 
Fee 
 ($40,000) 
20% Carried Interest  ($40,000) 
Net Profit                     $840,000 
4% Payout to  
University 
                   ($400,000) 
Addition to  
Endowment Capital 
                    $440,000 




The story set out in Table 3 repeats itself in subsequent years. In 
the second year, the endowment’s payout to the university would 
increase from $400,000 to $417,600, and in the third year it would 
increase further to $435,974. The net present value of all future pay-
outs, discounted at the 10% rate that reflects the risk of the endow-
ment’s investments, is $7.143 million, or considerably less than the 
initial $10 million contributed to the endowment.72 What has hap-
pened to the amount originally contributed for educational purposes 
is that a (large) fraction has been diverted to support investment pro-
fessionals and infrastructure. Presumably such diversion reflects 
neither the wishes of the donors nor the objectives embodied in the 
                                                                                                             
 72 This result is easy to derive and generalize. Let E be the amount contributed 
to the endowment ($10 million in the illustration). Let r be the expected rate of 
return on the endowment’s investments that appropriately reflects the risk of such 
investments (10% in the illustration). Let c be the percentage of assets paid to 
various investment advisors (1% in direct costs for all endowment assets and 2-
and-20 paid to fund managers, for an aggregate 1.6% in the illustration). Finally, 
let p be the payout rate to the university (4% in the illustration). Under these pred-
icates, the endowment’s assets and hence the university’s payouts grow at an an-
nual rate of (r – c – p): the former at the beginning of a hypothetical year n being 
(1 + r – c – p)(n-1)*E and the latter (paid at the end of year n) consequently being 
p*(1 + r – c – p)(n-1)*E. The net present value of the series of payouts, discounted 
at the appropriate discount rate of r, is p*E/(c + p). Thus, in the illustration, where 
p is 4% and c is effectively 1.6%, only 4/5.6 of the amount contributed to the 
endowment ultimately redounds to the benefit of the university; the remaining 
1.6/5.6 redounds to the benefit of the various investment professionals who di-
rectly and indirectly manage the endowment’s assets. 
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charitable contribution deduction.73 Table 2.3 modifies Table 2.2 to 
reflect the leakage caused by investment expenses.74 
 
Table 2.3 
Grant of  
Federal 
 Revenue to 
State to 
Fund        
Education 
Deduction 





Deduction for    
Contributions 




ing  Controlled by 
Federal  
Government 
$27 million $27 million $27 million 
Current Education 
Spending Con-
trolled by Federal  
Government 
$3 million75 $0 $0 
Current Education 
Spending Delegated 
by Federal  
$0 $3 million76 $0 
                                                                                                             
 73 This last point may be a slight overstatement, inasmuch as it is not entirely 
clear what all objectives are embodied in the charitable contribution deduction. 
Thus, under the Internal Revenue Code, tax-favorable treatment of education in-
cludes almost anything remotely connected with education. See, e.g., John D. Co-
lombo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for 
Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 857 (1993) (describing 
how federal and state attempts to limit the tax exemption for educational institu-
tions have failed). Under this standard-less standard, it is difficult to argue that 
expenditures on lavish physical plant or bloated administrative staffs with even 
more bloated compensation are not expenditures “on education.” But see infra 
Part IV. 
 74 Nothing in the arithmetic set forth in note 69 hinges on any particular pay-
out rate (or cost structure). Thus, if the payout rate doubled to 8% (as it would if 
Congress adopted the recommendations of Victor Fleischer, supra note 70) and 
the costs of managing endowments fell to 1% (as they might if all management 
were in-house), leakage of the donor’s gift would fall to 1/(1 + 8) or 11% of the 
gift. But even under those altered extremely favorable facts, fully $1.1 million or 
the original $10 million gift would never produce any higher education benefits. 
 75 See supra note 51. 
 76 See supra note 52. 






trolled by States 
$0 $7 million $0 
NPV of Future  
Education Spend-
ing Delegated by 
Federal Govern-




NPV of Future  
Education Spend-
ing Controlled by 
Donors 
$0 $0 $5 million78 
 
Now that I have established that a gift to a university endowment 
does not in general provide an expenditure on higher education in 
an amount equal to the gift’s face amount,79 let me return to the al-
leged benefits of funding higher education by means of tax-deduct-
ible gifts to endowments to see whether such benefits can plausibly 
compensate for investment expense leakage. The short answer is 
that they cannot. Indeed, one can argue that none of the alleged ben-
efits really exist. 
I can quickly dispose of the third alleged benefit: donor moni-
toring.80 Endowment gifts are generally one-time gifts that provide 
an irrevocable stream of future revenue to a chosen institution.81 
Once the gift is made, the donor has essentially no recourse even if 
the chosen institution grossly mismanages either the gift or the 
                                                                                                             
 77 This is 30% of the $7.143 million net present value of future education 
expenditures referenced in the text. See supra note 42. 
 78 This is 70% of the $7.143 million net present value of future education 
expenditures referenced in the text. 
 79 The prerequisite for a gift to provide an expenditure on higher education in 
an amount equal to its face amount is that the endowment is able to generate ex-
cess returns from its investment management that more than compensate for the 
cost of such management. As noted in supra note 64, this holy grail is ex ante 
impossible to achieve. 
 80 See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 81 See, e.g., Phung, supra note 62. 
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stream of revenue generated by the gift.82 Accordingly, a donor has 
little incentive to monitor the institution after the gift has been 
made.83 
I can also reject the second alleged benefit, the ability to piggy-
back on informed societal preferences.84 The basis for this rejection 
is that such piggybacking is antithetical to democratic principles.85 
The federal government, through elected officials, represents all 
people within its taxing jurisdiction, however imperfectly.86 Thus, 
any expenditure made by the federal government presumptively re-
flects the will of all 321 million of us.87 And state governments, in 
turn, represent all people within their taxing jurisdictions.88 Again, 
                                                                                                             
 82 See Schizer, supra note 30, at 263 (“Although conditions can be placed on 
how the endowment is used, it will be difficult for the donor to impose a condition 
relating to the quality of the effort, since the condition is hard to specify, let alone 
to enforce.”). 
 83 See id. (“If [donors] are willing to surrender control [by giving an endow-
ment], they must have particular confidence in the nonprofit’s management.”). 
 84 See supra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text. 
 85 See Schizer, supra note 30, at 247 (“[D]onors may not adequately represent 
the preferences of society as a whole, so that there is allocation error when the 
wrong projects are pursued.”). But see Az. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 
563 U.S. 125, 142 (2011) (“Yet tax credits and governmental expenditures do not 
both implicate individual taxpayers in sectarian activities . . . .When the govern-
ment declines to impose a tax . . . there is no such connection between dissenting 
taxpayer and alleged establishment.”). 
 86 Cf. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REV. 
555, 571–78, 595–97 (2002) (arguing that deductions inappropriately serve as se-
lective voting mechanisms by which taxpayers can divert otherwise public funds 
for their own purposes). 
 87 Cf. id. 
 88 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”). Cf. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503–04 (1999) (“A citizen 
of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any 
State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with 
every other citizen.” (quoting The Slaughter–House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 112–13 
(1872))) (emphasis added); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Gru-
met, 512 U.S. 687, 728–29 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)) 
(“When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireli-
gious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become 
separatist . . . .Since that system is at war with the democratic ideal, it should find 
no footing here.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But cf. Walz v. Tax 
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any expenditure made by such governments presumptively reflects 
the will of all people they represent.89 On the other hand, an endow-
ment gift made by a single donor reflects the will of only one gen-
erally wealthy—and therefore not terribly representative—individ-
ual. If such an individual merely controlled the ultimate educational 
use of his or her “excess generosity,” i.e., the incremental $4.143 
million in my illustration,90 there would be little cause to object; ab-
sent the charitable contribution such amounts presumably would not 
be spent on higher education at all. But such individual also controls 
the ultimate educational use of the $3 million in the illustration that 
the federal government intends to spend on higher education in any 
event. However inefficient the federal government may be in choos-
ing how to direct such spending, such inefficiency should be toler-
ated because the resulting spending will necessarily be significantly 
more reflective of the public will than spending directed by any in-
dividual donor would be.91 
                                                                                                             
Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 691 (1969) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Tax ex-
emptions, accordingly, constitute mere passive state involvement with religion 
and not the affirmative involvement characteristic of outright governmental sub-
sidy.”). 
 89 See, e.g., Az. Christian Sch., 563 U.S. at 142 (“A dissenter whose tax dol-
lars are ‘extracted and spent’ knows that he has in some small measure been made 
to contribute to an establishment in violation of conscience.”); id. at 148 (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (“Taxpayers who oppose state aid of religion have equal reason to 
protest whether that aid flows from the one form of subsidy or the other. Either 
way, the government has financed the religious activity. And so either way, tax-
payers should be able to challenge the subsidy.”). 
 90 This “excess generosity” in my illustration is the excess of the $7.143 mil-
lion spent on higher education over the $3 million that would have been spent 
directly by the federal government in lieu of establishing the charitable deduction 
mechanism. See supra Table 2.3. 
 91 See Schizer, supra note 30, at 244–48 (noting some of the problems with 
using tax preferences for charities as an allocative guide). See also Rick Seltzer, 
Strings Attached, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.insidehigh-
ered.com/news/2016/08/31/wayne-state-donor-agreement-goes-under-micro-
scope (giving an illustration of a donor’s arguable overreach in attempting to con-
trol a university’s use of an endowment gift). But see Brian Galle, The Role of 
Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777, 790–91 (2012) (dis-
cussing Burton Weisbrod’s Median Voter Theory and its application to charitable 
subsidies, stating that “[s]ubsidies for charity thus allow voters who want more of 
the good to surmount the free rider barrier.”). 
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But even after dismissing the latter two alleged benefits of al-
lowing deductions for contributions to university endowments, the 
first alleged benefit appears to retain its full force: in the illustration 
the deduction has led to $4.143 million of completely voluntary in-
cremental spending on higher education.92 Surely the benefits flow-
ing from the mere availability of these additional funds should more 
than compensate for the loss of the federal government’s control 
over $3 million of education spending.93 Put differently, is it not be-
yond a doubt that the public benefit generated by $7.143 million of 
public-spirited spending allocated according to the whims of a few 
wealthy and generous individuals must exceed the public benefit 
generated by $3 million of spending allocated according to the 
whims of the federal government? 
It may be beyond a doubt, but the premise is highly debatable. 
Undoubtedly, some donors give until it hurts.94 But many gifts that 
fund endowments are surely made by individuals who have amassed 
such considerable wealth that they do not envision any alternative 
lifetime or even testamentary need for the funds they donate.95 Thus, 
if such donors did not make their gifts, they would instead save and 
invest and generate additional investment income, which they would 
also save and invest, ad infinitum. However, each year, the federal 
government would take a slice of the additional income via taxation 
                                                                                                             
 92 See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 30, at 229. See also Table 2.3. 
 93 Or, in the alternative, the benefits from the additional funds should surely 
more than compensate for the loss of the federal government’s control over $3 
million of general spending. 
 94 See, e.g., Adam Lashinsky, Apple’s Tim Cook Leads Different, FORTUNE 
(Mar. 26, 2015, 7:40 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/03/26/tim-cook/ (“To Cook, 
changing the world always has been higher on Apple’s agenda than making 
money. He plans to give away all his wealth, after providing for the college edu-
cation of his 10-year-old nephew.”). 
 95 See, e.g., Douglas Belkin, Harvard Gets Largest-Ever Donation; Family 
of Hong Kong-Born Investor Gives $350 Million to His Alma Mater, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/harvard-gets-largest-ever-donation-
1410148865 (describing how Gerald Chan, a Harvard alum, donated $350 million 
to the school); Jeff Blumenthal, Local Law School Gets Another Major Gift, 
PHILA. BUS. J. (Mar. 19, 2015, 12:58 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/philadel-
phia/news/2015/03/19/local-law-school-gets-another-major-gift.html?page=all 
(describing how John F. Scarpa, founder and former co-chairman of American 
Cellular Network Corporation, gave Villanova University School of Law $5 mil-
lion in donations). 
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and direct the spending of such slice to satisfy public goals. It turns 
out that, over time, the entire amount that would have been gifted 
will ultimately be taxed away and thus be dedicated to the service of 
public goals. While this sounds like confiscatory taxation and may 
indeed be a justification for such taxation, it is in fact nothing more 
than a formalization of the reality that if a taxpayer has more wealth 
than he or she has any reasonable hope of ever consuming, the ex-
cess will in one way or another—whether by contribution or by tax-
ation—ultimately be dedicated to public goals. 
To illustrate this point, assume (without any loss of generality) 
that the hypothetical $10 million income pool belongs to a single 
wealthy donor. If the donor makes a contribution to a university en-
dowment, the endowment receives an additional $10 million, the 
federal government loses $3 million, and spending on higher educa-
tion appears to increase by a net of $7 million (although as demon-
strated above in fact only increases by a net of $4.143 million).96 On 
the other hand, if the donor does not make a contribution, the federal 
government gets $3 million of immediate tax revenue and the donor 
has an incremental $7 million to save and invest. Suppose that in-
vestments earn a pre-tax expected rate of return of 10% and that such 
earnings are taxed at the same 30% rate as the donor’s remaining 
income.97 Then, in the first year after not making a donation, the 
donor earns $700,000 more than he or she would otherwise have 
earned and pays $210,000 more in federal income tax than he or she 
would otherwise have paid. After the dust settles on such earnings 
and taxes, the donor’s incremental investment pool increases to 
$7.49 million. And this process repeats itself in the next year, and 
the next, and so on. 
The first important thing to note is that the federal government 
now has a revenue stream that it would not have had if the donor 
had made his initial contribution. Stated differently, the initial con-
tribution did not merely deprive the federal government of $3 mil-
lion of immediate tax revenue, it also deprived the federal govern-
ment of $210,000 of tax revenue in the following year, and so on in 
perpetuity. The second important thing to note is that the only leak-
age from the income pool is to the federal government in the form 
of taxes. If this remains true year in and year out, as it will if the 
                                                                                                             
 96 See supra Table 2.1 and Table 2.3. 
 97 These rates are for purposes of illustration only and do not affect the result. 
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donor really has no alternative need of or use for the funds, then the 
net present value of revenues that eventually will be siphoned off by 
the federal government will indeed be $10 million. Thus, the entire 
pool will be spent by the federal government in pursuit of public 
goals.98 Table 2.4 updates Table 2.3 to reflect this reality: allowing 
a tax deduction for a contribution to an endowment does not result 










                                                                                                             
 98 This result is easy to derive and generalize; it is arithmetically the same as 
the result that was derived in supra note 72. Let D be the amount otherwise con-
tributed to the endowment ($10 million in the illustration). Let r be the expected 
pre-tax rate of return on the invested assets (10% in the illustration). Let t be the 
tax rate imposed on the pre-tax return (30% in the illustration), in which case (1 – 
t)*r is the after-tax rate or return (7% in the illustration). Note that the initial 
amount of invested assets is (1 – t)*D ($7 million in the illustration), since t*D of 
tax would be collected in the absence of a contribution ($3 million in the illustra-
tion). Thus, r*(1 – t)*D of pre-tax income will be generated in the first year 
($700,000 in the illustration), which in turn leads to a tax payment of t*r*(1 – 
t)*D ($210,000 in the illustration). At the end of the first year, the amount of in-
vested assets grows to (1 + (1– t)*r)*(1 – t)*D ($7.49 million in the illustration). 
In the nth year, the invested assets will earn pre-tax income of r*(1 + (1– t)*r)n-
1*(1 – t)*D, which will yield a tax payment of t*r*(1 + (1– t)*r)n-1*(1 – t)*D. 
Moreover, at the end of the nth year, the amount of invested assets will grow to 
(1 + (1– t)*r)n*(1 – t)*D. The federal government’s revenue stream is as follows: 
it initially collects t*D; it then collects t*r*(1 – t)*D at the end of the first year; 
and it collects t*r*(1 + (1– t)*r)n-1*(1 – t)*D at the end of the year n. When this 
revenue steam is discounted at the appropriate discount rate of r, the initial tax 
payment has a net present value of t*D, the year 1 tax payment has a net present 
value of t*r*(1 – t)*D/(1 + r), and the year n tax payment has a net present value 
of t*r*(1 + (1– t)*r)n-1*(1 – t)*D/(1 + r)n. And the sum of the net present value of 
all such tax payments turns out to be D! Thus, to repeat, if no part of the otherwise 
contributed and perpetually reinvested assets is ever diverted to private consump-
tion, the federal government will eventually effectively confiscate all such assets. 
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Table 2.4 
(Potential Cash Contribution) 
Grant of  
Federal  
Revenue to 
State to Fund  
Education 
Deduction for    
Contributions 
used to Fund    
Education 
Current Non-Education 
Spending Controlled by  
Federal Government 
$27 million $27 million 
Current Education Spending 
Controlled by Federal  
Government 
$3 million $0 
NPV of Future Education and 
Non-Education Spending Con-
trolled by Federal Government 
$7 million $0 
NPV of Future Education 
Spending Delegated by Federal 
Government to Donors 
$0 $2.143 million 
NPV of Future Education 
Spending Controlled by  
Donors 
$0 $5 million 
 
To summarize, the effects of granting (versus not granting) a tax 
deduction to a donor who contributes to an educational endowment 
manifest themselves along three dimensions: (1) how much is actu-
ally spent in pursuit of higher education and/or in pursuit of other 
public goals, (2) when such amounts are spent, and (3) who controls 
how such amounts are spent. Under the assumptions illustrated in 
Table 2.4, if no charitable contribution deduction exists to induce a 
$10 million cash gift to an endowment, the federal government will 
receive $30 million of tax revenue today, will receive an additional 
$7 million (in terms of net present value) in subsequent years, and 
will control the spending of all such revenue. With respect to the 
future revenue, the federal government retains the flexibility to al-
locate such revenue to public goals, including but not limited to 
higher education, as such goals evolve over time.99 On the other 
                                                                                                             
 99 Cf. Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Sup-
port for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. 
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hand, if a charitable contribution deduction induces a $10 million 
cash gift to an educational endowment, the federal government will 
receive $27 million of tax revenue today, public goals in the form of 
education will receive $7.143 million (in terms of net present value) 
in subsequent years, and all such $7.143 million will be spent ac-
cording to a non-public administrator’s interpretation of the individ-
ual donor’s wishes.100 In this case, the $7.143 million of future 
spending will be restricted to higher education at a single institution, 
even if higher education funding in general ceases to be a recognized 
public goal or if higher education funding of the specified institution 
in particular ceases to be a desirable goal. Thus, in the context of a 
cash gift to an educational endowment, it is trivial to weigh the costs 
and benefits of the charitable contribution deduction: there are no 
benefits! Accordingly, there is no theoretical justification for grant-
ing such tax deduction. 
And as can be seen in Table 2.5, the picture only gets worse if 
the donor’s contribution is made in the form of appreciated capital 




                                                                                                             
REV. 179, 198 (2013) (“[I]n requiring particular taxes to fund only specified pro-
grams, we lose the flexibility to redirect tax dollars as conditions change. All else 
being equal, the government should want this flexibility.”). 
 100 See, e.g., Phung, supra note 62 (providing an overview of how endow-
ments function). 
 101 Recall, supra note 33 and Table 1.2, the possibility that the income from 
which the deductible contribution would be made consisted entirely of unrealized 
capital gain. If so, then in the absence of a contribution, the foregoing argument, 
supra text accompanying notes 94-98, leads to the result that the federal govern-
ment would eventually obtain tax revenue with a net present value of $10 million 
from the $10 million that would have been contributed to the endowment. (This 
is true even in the presence of the realization doctrine, which might lead the tax-
payer to defer the realization of the gain with respect to some or all of the $10 
million he would otherwise have contributed. See, e.g., DANIEL Q. POSIN & 
DONALD B. TOBIN, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 
152–66 (7th ed. 2005) (briefly discussing the realization requirement for federal 
income taxation); Christopher H. Hanna, Demystifying Tax Deferral, 52 SMU L. 
REV. 383, 411–12 (1999) (explaining the issue of unrealized appreciation through 
an example)). 
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Table 2.5 
(Potential Property  
Contribution) 
Grant of  
Federal  
Revenue to 




used to Fund    
Education 
Current Non-Education 
Spending  Controlled by  
Federal Government 
$13.5 million $10.5 million 
Current Education Spending   
Controlled by Federal  
Government 
$1.5 million $0 
NPV of Future Education and 
Non-Education Spending  
Controlled by Federal 
Government 
$8.5 million $0 
NPV of Future Education 
Spending Delegated by Federal 




NPV of Future Education 






In Table 2.5, if no charitable contribution deduction exists to in-
duce a $10 million property gift to an endowment, the federal gov-
ernment will receive $15 million of tax revenue today, will receive 
an additional $8.5 million (in terms of net present value) in subse-
quent years, and will control the spending of all such revenue. With 
respect to the future revenue, the federal government will retain the 
flexibility to allocate such revenue to public goals, including but not 
limited to higher education, as such goals evolve over time. On the 
                                                                                                             
 102 As the contribution costs the federal government $4.5 million of revenue, 
the federal government’s share of the gift is effectively 45%. As set forth in supra 
note 72, the entire $10 million gift only leads to $7.143 million net present value 
of future spending on education. The $3.214 million figure in the table is 45% of 
$7.143 million. 
 103 As the contribution costs the federal government $4.5 million of revenue, 
the donor’s share of the gift is effectively 55%. As set forth in supra note 72, the 
entire $10 million gift only leads to $7.143 million net present value of future 
spending on education. The $3.929 million figure in the table is 55% of $7.143 
million. 
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other hand, if a charitable contribution deduction induces a $10 mil-
lion property gift to an educational endowment, then exactly as in 
the case of a cash gift (see Table 2.4), the federal government will 
receive less tax revenue today ($10.5 million instead of $15 million), 
while public goals in the form of education will receive $7.143 mil-
lion (in terms of net present value) in subsequent years, all of which 
will be spent according to a non-public administrator’s interpreta-
tion of the individual donor’s wishes. Moreover, the $7.143 million 
of future spending will be restricted to higher education at a single 
institution, even if higher education funding in general ceases to be 
a recognized public goal or if higher education funding of the spec-
ified institution in particular ceases to be a desirable goal. Thus, as 
was the case with respect to a cash gift, there is no theoretical justi-
fication for granting a tax deduction for a property gift to an educa-
tional endowment. 
IV. THE EVIDENCE 
Is there any evidence that would-be public funds diverted to ed-
ucational endowments by the grant of tax preferences efficiently sat-
isfy public goals? In particular, do such endowments somehow lead 
to the societal purchase of more or better education? I cannot answer 
that question with respect to the bare existence of endowments,104 
                                                                                                             
 104 Relevant literature contains one thorough attempt to divine possible rea-
sons behind the existence of university endowments. See generally Henry Hans-
mann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1990). 
Hansmann’s possible reasons include the following: (1) endowments are a means 
to provide intergenerational equity; (2) they serve as a financial buffer during pe-
riods of adversity; (3) they insure the long-run survival of reputational capital; (4) 
they protect intellectual freedom; and (5) they allow current generations to pass 
on their values. See id. at 14, 19, 27, 29, 32. But Hansmann ultimately concludes 
that none of these reasons explain actual university practice with respect to their 
endowments. See id. at 39. See also Peter Conti-Brown, Note, Scarcity Amidst 
Wealth: The Law, Finance, and Culture of Elite University Endowments in Fi-
nancial Crisis, 63 STAN. L. REV. 699, 705–15 (2011) (arguing that the financial 
buffer rationale is not supported by university behavior in the face of the recent 
financial crisis). 
Even if Hansmann had found university practice consistent with one or more of 
his proffered reasons for the existence of endowments, this consistency would not 
justify granting endowments tax-preferential treatment. Such treatment—which, 
as I have demonstrated, supra Part III, is equivalent to diverting public funds to 
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but I will attempt an answer with respect to their growth. But if an 
increase in the size of endowments does not lead to more or better 
education, then the actual existence of endowments cannot do so ei-
ther.105 
I limit my attention to the top-twenty private universities, as 
ranked by U.S. News and World Report.106 I do this mostly to keep 
the data set manageable, but also because these universities control 
the lion’s share of endowed funds.107 I further limit my attention to 
                                                                                                             
endowments—can only be justified if endowments serve public goals. Institu-
tional survival (which is essentially what three of Hansmann’s reasons amount to) 
is not a public goal. See Hansmann, supra note 104, at 19, 27, 32. And while 
intergenerational equity may or may not be a public goal, it is at best a subsidiary 
one that presupposes that endowment dollars are actually purchasing some more 
fundamental public goal (for example, improving the quality of the education pro-
vided to members of various generations). See id. at 14. That leaves only the en-
couragement of intellectual freedom as a possible stand-alone public goal. See id. 
at 29. But that goal is problematic as well, unless it leads to better education. First 
and foremost, the tenure system—rather than the existence of educational endow-
ments—is the primary defender of intellectual freedom, at least in a qualitative 
sense—that is, with respect to what is said. See, e.g., Grimes v. E. Ill. Univ., 710 
F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The purpose of tenure is to protect academic free-
dom—the freedom to teach and write without fear of retribution for expressing 
heterodox ideas . . . .”). See also AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT 
OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE 
COMMENTS 14 (1940), available at https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20State-
ment.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2017). Moreover, that defending intellectual free-
dom in a quantitative sense—that is, with respect to how much of it is said—is 
such a desirable stand-alone goal that it should be subsidized with public funds is 
unclear. To wit, even the most zealous defender of the academy would be hard-
pressed to argue that an insufficient amount of “scholarship” is currently being 
produced by America’s universities. See, e.g., Arif E. Jinha, Article 50 Million: 
An Estimate of the Number of Scholarly Articles in Existence, 23 LEARNED PUB. 
258, 261 (2010) (estimating the total number of scholarly articles in existence to 
be almost 50 million by the end of 2008). 
 105 This is an arithmetic point. If increased endowment size produces no de-
monstrable benefit, then decreased size would not produce any demonstrable det-
riment, and in the limit, decreased size would result in the disappearance of en-
dowments altogether. 
 106 National Universities Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 2015, at 74. 
 107 See U.S. and Canadian Institutions Listed by Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 En-
dowment Market Value and Change in Endowment Market Value from FY2014 to 
FY2015, NAT’L ASS’N OF C. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, http://www.nacubo.org/
Documents/EndowmentFiles/2015_NCSE_Endowment_Market_Values.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2017) [hereinafter NACUBO, FY 2015 Endowment Market 
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the years between 1990 and 2015, since this period witnessed a me-
teoric increase in the size of endowments and since other data are 
also readily available for this period.108 As shown in Table 4, during 
these two-and-a-half decades, the average size of these private uni-
versities’ endowments increased 735% from $1.244 billion to 
$10.378 billion, or at an annual compounded rate of 8.86%. By the 
end of the period, these endowments controlled $218 billion of what 





























                                                                                                             
Value]; Chris Isidore, Rich Universities Are Getting Richer, CNN MONEY (Apr. 
18, 2015, 7:08 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/16/pf/college/richest-univer-
sities/. 
 108 Compare NACUBO, FY 2015 Endowment Market Value, supra note 107 
(listing Harvard University as having nearly $36 billion in endowment assets in 
2014), with Institutions Ranked by 1990 Market Value of Endowment Assets, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF C. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS 23, http://www.nacubo.org/Research
/NACUBO-Commonfund_Study_of_Endowments/Public_NCSE_Tables/Total_
Market_Value_of_Endowments.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017) [hereinafter 
NACUBO, FY 1990 Endowment Market Value] (accessed through “1990 Total 
Market Values” link) (listing Harvard University as having over $4.6 billion of 
endowment assets in 1990). 
 109 See infra Table 4. 
 110 Table 4 combines statistics retrieved from the NACUBO-Commonfund 
Study of Endowment Results with U.S. News and World Report university rank-
ings, with public universities removed. See NACUBO, FY 1990 Endowment Mar-
ket Value, supra note 108; NACUBO, FY 2015 Endowment Market Value, supra 
note 107; National Universities Rankings, supra note 106. 
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 Average $1,243,527,238 $10,377,609,000 
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Whatever the increase in endowment size from 1990 to 2015 
purchased, it is quite clear that it did not purchase more education.111 
As shown in Table 5, during this period, the average full-time un-
dergraduate enrollment at the top-twenty private universities in-
creased by an anemic 22.1%, from 5,376 to 6,564 students. This in-
crease works out to an annual compounded rate of only 0.80%.112 
During this period, the average amount of endowed funds per full-
time undergraduate student at the top-twenty private universities in-








1990 Full-Time    
Undergraduate    
Enrollment 
2015 Full-Time  
Undergraduate   
Enrollment 
1 Princeton  
University 
4,497 5,275 
2 Harvard  
University 
6,587 6,688 
3 Yale  
University 
5,185 5,470 
4 Columbia  
University 
3,265 6,170 
4 Stanford  
University 
6,505 7,019 
4 University of  
Chicago 
3,382 5,616 




8 Duke  
University 
5,950 6,601 
                                                                                                             
 111 See infra Table 5 (noting that the percentage increase in endowment size 
far outpaced the increase in undergraduate enrollment increases). 
 112 See id. 
 113 Compare supra Table 4, with infra Table 5. 
 114 Undergraduate enrollment data was obtained from U.S. News and World 
Report. See Directory of Colleges and Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
2015 [hereinafter Directory 2015]; Directory of Colleges and Universities, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., 1990 [hereinafter Directory 1990]. 
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9 University of  
Pennsylvania 
9,395 9,437 




10 Johns Hopkins  
University 
3,170 6,161 
12 Dartmouth  
College 
3,795 4,228 
12 Northwestern  
University 
7,331 8,278 
14 Brown  
University 
5,608 6,255 
15 Cornell  
University 
12,716 14,453 
15 Vanderbilt  
University 
5,157 6,778 




18 Rice  
University 
2,741 3,872 
18 University of  
Notre Dame 
7,500 8,340 
20 Emory  
University 
4,711 7,732 










While endowments have had at most a negligible impact on the 
number of students being educated, it is conceivable that they have 
had a greater impact either on the cost of education or on educational 
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quality.115 Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure either of these po-
tential impacts.116 To assess any impact endowments may have on 
cost, we must compare the actual change in the cost of a university 
education to the change that would have occurred had the universi-
ties not had their endowments. Unfortunately, this comparison pre-
sents a counterfactual, so I can only offer a conjecture.117 But I am 
skeptical that endowment growth has placed any serious restraint on 
the cost of a university education.118 When the ever-increasing 
sticker price of these elite educations is compared to the personal 
consumption expenditures index generally,119 it is hard to believe 
                                                                                                             
 115 See Sarah E. Waldeck, The Coming Showdown Over University Endow-
ments: Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV 1795, 1798 (2009). See also, 
e.g., Thomas M. Stauffer, Quality in American Education, in QUALITY—HIGHER 
EDUCATION’S PRINCIPAL CHALLENGE 1, 2 (Thomas M. Stauffer ed., 1981) 
(“Quality is someone’s subjective assessment, for there is no way of objectively 
measuring what is in essence an attribute of value.” (quoting ALLAN M. CARTTER, 
AN ASSESSMENT OF QUALITY IN GRADUATE EDUCATION 4 (1966)) (emphasis in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116 See, e.g., Stauffer, supra note 115, at 2. 
 117 Many supporters of the current tax treatment of college and university en-
dowments are more than willing to claim that educational endowments directly 
impact educational quality, however. See, e.g., Anthony W. Marx, Defending Col-
lege Endowments, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/la-oe-
marx12-2008oct12-story.html (“It’s a good thing that colleges have been allowed 
to tend to [their] resources as needed . . . .Because . . . endowed colleges can now 
use that money to continue to offer generous financial aid packages for our na-
tion’s best, brightest and neediest students . . . .”); Myths About College and Uni-
versity Endowments, ASS’N AM. UNIV. 2 (Jan. 26, 2009), https://www.aau.edu
/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=7792 (“For colleges and universities with 
sizable endowments, the difference [between the tuition charged by the institution 
and the cost of education per individual] is subsidized by earnings from their en-
dowments.”). But even if the subsidization argument were true, the increase in 
demand for the services these colleges and universities provide caused by this 
subsidization would theoretically result in an increase—rather than a decrease—
in the cost to the individual student. See Waldeck, supra note 117, at 1798. 
 118 See, e.g., Alexander E.M. Hess & Samuel Weigley, Universities Getting 
the Most Government Money, 24/7 WALL ST. (Apr. 25, 2013, 6:43 AM), 
http://247wallst.com/special-report/2013/04/25/universities-getting-the-most-
government-money/ (discussing how schools with substantial endowments also 
receive the greatest amount of federal funding). 
 119 See, e.g., Janet Lorin, College Tuition in the U.S. Again Rises Faster Than 
Inflation, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
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that endowment growth can possibly have had any positive effect on 
keeping education prices in check.120 As shown in Table 6, full-time 
tuition at these elite universities during the relevant period increased 
237.84% from an average of $14,061 to an average of $47,504, 
which works out to a 4.99% annualized rate. During the same pe-
riod, consumer prices increased 81%, which works out to a          
2.40% annualized rate.121 In other words, notwithstanding a massive 
increase in the size of endowments, tuition rose, year-in and year-




Rank School 1990 Full-Time 
Tuition & Fees 
2015 Full-Time    
Tuition & Fees 
1 Princeton  
University 
$15,440 $43,450 
2 Harvard  
University 
$14,450 $45,278 
3 Yale  
University 
$15,180 $47,600 
4 Columbia  
University 
$14,472 $51,008 
4 Stanford  
University 
$14,280 $46,320 
                                                                                                             
news/articles/2014-11-13/college-tuition-in-the-u-s-again-rises-faster-than-infla-
tion (noting that at private and public institutions, tuition and fee expenses have 
generally outpaced any increases to the consumption expenditures index). 
 120 Indeed, one can argue that the schools capture the benefits generated by 
endowments. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 115, at 1817–18. 
 121 The percentage rate increase of consumer prices was derived by using the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI calculator to compute the amount required to buy 
the same basket of goods in 2015 that could have been purchased for $1.00 in 
1990. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 122 See also Danielle Kurtzleben, Charts: Just How Fast Has College Tuition 
Grown?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:56 PM), http://www.us-
news.com/news/articles/2013/10/23/charts-just-how-fast-has-college-tuition-
grown. 
 123 Tuition data were obtained from U.S. News and World Report. See Direc-
tory, 2015, supra note 114; Directory 1990, supra note 114. 
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4 University of  
Chicago 
$14,895 $50,193 




8 Duke  
University 
$13,760 $49,341 
9 University of 
Pennsylvania 
$13,450 $49,536 




10 Johns Hopkins  
University 
$15,000 $48,710 
12 Dartmouth  
College 
$15,267 $49,506 
12 Northwestern  
University 
$13,725 $49,047 
14 Brown  
University 
$15,295 $49,346 
15 Cornell  
University 
$15,164 $49,116 
15 Vanderbilt  
University 
$13,975 $43,838 




18 Rice  
University 
$6,900 $42,253 
18 University of  
Notre Dame 
$12,390 $47,929 
20 Emory  
University 
$13,500 $46,314 
20 Georgetown  
University 
$14,440 $48,611 
 Average $14,061 $47,504 
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Unfortunately, unlike quantity or cost, it is next to impossible to 
measure the quality of the educations being delivered.124 One could 
analyze a time series of standardized test scores for graduate and 
professional schools, such as the GRE, the LSAT, the MCAT, or the 
GMAT, to see how performance has changed over the last         
twenty-five years.125 However, some college students (even at elite 
universities) do not take these tests.126 Moreover, the makeup of 
these tests and the grading of these tests has changed over time.127 
                                                                                                             
 124 See, e.g., Stauffer, supra note 115, at 2 (“Quality is someone’s subjective 
assessment, for there is no way of objectively measuring what is in essence an 
attribute of value.” (quoting ALLAN M. CARTTER, AN ASSESSMENT OF QUALITY 
IN GRADUATE EDUCATION 4 (1966)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 125 U.S. News and World Report bases their school rankings in part on these 
test scores. See, e.g., Robert Morse, Eric Brooks, & Matt Mason, How U.S. News 
Calculated the 2017 Best Colleges Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 
12, 2016, 10:00 PM), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/arti-
cles/how-us-news-calculated-the-rankings; Brian Huddleston, USN&WR Law 
School Rankings, Color-Coded Changes, 2015 to 2016 Editions, BRIAN 
HUDDLESTON BLOG (Mar. 25, 2015, 12:56 PM), http://brianhuddleston.blogspot.
com/2015/03/usn-law-school-rankings-color-coded.html; Ry Rivard, Lowering 
the Bar, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.
com/news/2015/01/16/law-schools-compete-students-many-may-not-have-admit
ted-past (noting that the median LSAT scores of admitted law students have been 
in a state of decline). But see Jack Schneider & Anil Nathan, How to Measure 
School Quality, EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles
/2013/10/30/10schneider.h33.html. 
 126 See Delece Smith-Barrow, As Law Schools Undergo Reform, Some Relax 
LSAT Requirements, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 2, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/arti-
cles/2015/04/02/as-law-schools-undergo-reform-some-relax-lsat-requirements; 
Todd Johnson, BS/MD Programs That Don’t Require the MCAT, COLL. 
ADMISSIONS PARTNERS (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.collegeadmissionspartners.
com/bsmd-programs/bsmd-programs-dont-require-mcat/; Aidan Sullivan, Ten 
Graduate School Programs That Don’t Require the GRE, ACCEPT U (Oct. 5, 
2015) http://acceptu.com/2015/10/ten-graduate-school-programs-dont-require-
gre/; Rachel Beckstead, MBA No GMAT: MBA Programs That Don’t Require the 
GMAT, COLL. ATLAS (June 7, 2016), https://www.collegeatlas.org/mba-programs
-that-dont-require-gmat. 
 127 See, e.g., Jamie Gumbrecht, Major Changes Coming to 2016 SAT Test: 
Here’s What, How and Why, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/05/living/sat-
test-changes-schools/ (last updated Mar. 6, 2014, 10:34 AM); Morse, Brooks, & 
Mason, supra note 125 (factoring SAT and ACT scores into a school’s “selectiv-
ity score” only for those students who actually took the tests). 
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Thus, comparing test results from different years would be largely 
meaningless. And in any event, such comparisons would arguably 
be measuring the wrong thing.128 To wit, at least one commentator 
has persuasively argued that value-added is the only valid measure 
of the quality of any education because value-added is the only ob-
jective market assessment of educational quality.129 
While difficult, it is generally possible to determine the value-
added of a particular education.130 I opt here, however, for some-
thing simpler. I will compare the value-added from a private univer-
sity education to the value-added from the closest competing prod-
uct, a public university education. My data is the entry-level and 
mid-career salaries earned by graduates of the top-twenty private 
universities and the top-ten public universities. See Table 7. My aim 
is to produce a crude measure of excess-bang-for-the-excess-buck. 
That is, I will determine what kind of return private university stu-
dents receive in the employment market in exchange for the addi-
tional tuition that they pay to private universities.131 
                                                                                                             
 128 See id.; supra note 126. 
 129 See generally Douglas C. Bennett, Assessing Quality in Higher Education, 
87 LIBERAL EDUC. 40, 40–45 (2001). For other perspectives on how to measure 
educational quality, see generally RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA ROKSA, 
ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT: LIMITED LEARNING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 59–89 
(2011) (evaluating institutions by selectivity and college major relative to the re-
quired reading and writing requirements for classes at those institutions, as well 
as using other criteria); Lewis C. Solomon, A Multidimensional Approach to 
Quality, in QUALITY—HIGHER EDUCATION’S PRINCIPAL CHALLENGE 6–14 
(Thomas M. Stauffer ed., 1981) (suggesting criteria subjective to an institution’s 
and its students’ specific goals while also noting “value added” as a key consid-
eration in developing these criteria). 
 130 See, e.g., Herwig Schlunk, Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To 
Be . . . Lawyers 1–4 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 09-29, 
2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1497044 (specifically 
the methodology employed to value law degrees). 
 131 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Weighing the Costs in Public vs. Private Col-
lege, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/13/educa-
tion/13voices.html (noting that for many the cost of attendance should be a con-
sideration when selecting a university). See also Valerie Strauss, Costs of Public 
vs. Private College, WASH. POST: THE ANSWER SHEET (Jan. 12, 2010, 6:30 AM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/answer-sheet/college-costs/comparing-costs-
of-public-priv.html (showing the disparity between public and private educational 
institution prices). 
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What does the data show? The excess of the tuition at a top-
twenty private university over the in-state tuition at a top-ten public 
university averages $33,982 per year, for an aggregate of $135,928 
over the course of a four-year college education.132 In exchange for 
this additional tuition, graduates of the private universities earn, on 
average, an additional $6,646 in their first year of employment and 
an additional $11,950 per year in the middle of their careers.133 
While determining the appropriate discount rate to apply for the pur-
pose of valuing these incremental earnings would be difficult and 
controversial, even relatively modest discount rates support the ar-
gument that private university students earn, at best, a fair return on 



















                                                                                                             
 132 See infra Table 7. 
 133 See id. 
 134 For example, assume that incremental wages begin at $6,646, grow to 
$11,950 after fifteen years in the workforce, and (improbably) continue to grow 
at that same rate for the remainder of a forty-year career. In that case, if a discount 
rate of 8% is applied, the incremental wages have a net present value of $134,200, 
or slightly less than the incremental tuition that was paid to achieve them. For 
reasons I have articulated elsewhere, one could argue that 8% is an indefensibly 
low discount rate to apply to such incremental wages. See Schlunk, supra note 
133, at 7–8. 
































$43,450 $61,300 $122,000 
2 Harvard 
University 
$45,278 $61,400 $126,000 
3 Yale  
University 
$47,600 $60,300 $104,000 
4 Columbia 
University 
$51,008 $60,200 $104,000 
4 Stanford 
University 
$46,320 $65,900 $123,000 
4 University of 
Chicago 




$46,704 $74,900 $124,000 
8 Duke  
University 
$49,341 $60,600 $111,000 
9 University of 
Pennsylvania 




$45,390 $72,600 $125,000 
10 Johns Hopkins
University 
$48,710 $57,500 $97,500 
12 Dartmouth 
College 
$49,506 $56,300 $111,000 
                                                                                                             
 135 For tuition data, see National University Rankings, supra note 106 (data 
accessed through each school’s individual profile). For salary data, see 2015-2016 
PayScale College Salary Report, PAYSCALE, https://web.archive.org/web/20160
313085131/http://www.payscale.com/college-salary-report/bachelors (data re-
trieved from March 13, 2016 archived site because website figures were updated 
to reflect the 2016-2017 academic year). 




$49,047 $56,300 $102,000 
14 Brown  
University 
$49,346 $57,100 $108,000 
15 Cornell  
University 
$49,116 $59,700 $109,000 
15 Vanderbilt 
University 




$48,093 $55,500 $105,000 
18 Rice  
University 
$42,253 $63,900 $114,000 
18 University of 
Notre Dame 
$47,929 $57,400 $106,000 
20 Emory  
University 
$46,314 $51,300 $89,800 
20 Georgetown 
University 

































2015-16   








1 University of 
California, 
Berkeley 
$13,432 $59,500 $114,000 
2 University of 
California, 
Los Angeles 
$12,753 $51,800 $96,900 
3 University of 
Virginia 
$14,526 $54,700 $97,600 
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4 University of 
Michigan at 
Ann Arbor 
$14,336 $58,000 $96,000 
5 University of 
North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill 
$8,562 $46,200 $79,400 
6 College of 
William 
and Mary 
$16,919 $45,900 $92,500 
7 Georgia  
Institute of 
Technology 
$12,204 $62,500 $112,000 
8 University of 
California at 
Santa Barbara 
$13,865 $49,400 $96,300 
9 University of 
California at 
Irvine 
$14,577 $49,900 $97,700 
9 University of 
California at 
San Diego 










This result is hardly surprising. Giving private university educa-
tions the benefit of the doubt by treating the return earned on excess 
tuition payments as a full, fair market return, the result says nothing 
more than that, from the perspective of buyers (that is, the students 
or their parents), the market for a college education appears to be 
efficient. Private university students get what their tuition dollars 
pay for, no less and no more. But this observation in turn casts a 
troubling shadow over the grant of tax preferences to private univer-
sity endowments. 
I take it as an article of faith that the only legitimate beneficiaries 
of private university endowments are university students.136 That is, 
                                                                                                             
 136 See supra Introduction, at 3. Cf. Paul G. Haskell, The University as Trustee, 
17 GA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1982) (“[T]he university is indeed a model of fiduciary re-
sponsibility to students and the community at large. As a fiduciary it should be 
accountable to those it serves . . . .”). 
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the federal government has a public goal of having an educated pop-
ulace.137 When the government provides education directly, that is 
through the states, it takes value in the form of taxes from those who 
are, on balance, already better educated (i.e., workers and investors) 
and transfers such value in the form of a public university education 
to those who are on balance less educated (i.e., students).138 Alter-
natively, when the government provides education indirectly by 
granting tax benefits to private donors, it allows some of those who 
are, on balance, already better educated (i.e., donors) to take value 
in the form of net contributions to private universities and the ac-
companying federal tax expenditures and effectively transfer such 
value in the form of a private university education to those who are, 
on balance, less educated (i.e., students).139 In other words, the pur-
pose of diverting what would otherwise be public funds to private 
university endowments is to educate—and consequently transfer 
value to—private university students.140 
If such a transfer is indeed occurring, then I should find, given 
the massive increase in the amount of would-be public funds that 
have been diverted to private university endowments during the past 
two-and-a-half decades,141 that private university students earn a 
significant extraordinary return on their excess tuition dollars.142 
This extraordinary return would represent the amount of value trans-
ferred by the endowments to the students. In addition, I should find 
that such extraordinary return was increasing over time, reflecting 
the increase in the size of the endowments.143 In light of these ex-
pected findings, the result of a merely fair return on excess tuition 
dollars is disappointing. 
If private university endowments are not financing extraordinary 
returns for private university students, relative to the returns those 
                                                                                                             
 137 But see Colombo, supra note 73, at 844–45 (arguing that while the legisla-
tive history behind the tax exemption of educational institutions is nonexistent, 
the exemption has its origins in the former ministerial purposes of those institu-
tions). 
 138 See supra Part II. 
 139 See id. 
 140 Cf. Hansmann, Why Are Colleges and Universities Exempt from Taxes?, 
supra note 18 (minus 117), at 4. 
 141 See supra Table 4. 
 142 See supra Table 7. 
 143 Compare supra Table 4, with supra Table 7. 
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students would achieve by instead investing in public university ed-
ucations, they must be financing something else. There are two pos-
sibilities. The first possibility is that private university endowments 
may be financing transfers of value to students that precisely offset 
any transfers of value such students would receive if such students 
instead attended public universities. This would be quite a coinci-
dence. Among its requirements is that public university students 
must in fact be receiving transfers of value. They may be: a public 
university education may be more valuable than the tuition spent to 
purchase it. Suppose that it is. If excess tuition spent on a private 
university education produces exactly a fair return, it follows that a 
private university education is also more valuable than the tuition 
spent to purchase it, indeed by exactly the same amount as a public 
university education. If there is such a transfer of value in the case 
of a private university education, it must be funded somehow—pri-
vate university endowments are the most likely source of such fund-
ing.144 
There is a second possibility. Private university endowments 
may be financing expenditures that provide little or no benefit to 
students at all. For example, private universities may be using their 
endowments to finance ever-larger faculties with ever-lighter teach-
ing loads.145 Or, they may be inefficiently throwing additional dol-
lars at items such as enhanced physical plant, higher faculty salaries, 
and increased overhead, including larger administrative staffs and 
higher administrative salaries.146 
                                                                                                             
 144 Cf. JORGE KLOR DE ALVA & MARK SCHNEIDER, NEXUS RES. & POL’Y 
CTR., Rich Schools, Poor Students: Tapping Large University Endowments to Im-
prove Student Outcomes 4–9 & tbl. 1 (Apr. 2015), available at http://nex-
usresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Rich_Schools_Poor_Students.pdf 
(the amount of tax subsidies for private universities with high endowments is sub-
stantially greater than that for public universities). 
 145 See, e.g., Andrew J. Rotherham, College Endowments: Why Even Harvard 
Isn’t as Rich as You Think, TIME (Feb. 9, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/
02/09/college-endowments-why-even-harvard-isnt-as-rich-as-you-think/ (“When 
your alma mater calls you and asks for a donation, it’s really hoping you’ll give 
to its general fund, where the use of your donation is unrestricted. Donations 
[given] for scholarships or specific degrees, programs or activities can be used 
only for those purposes.”). 
 146 See, e.g., Douglas Belkin & Scott Thurm, Deans List: Hiring Spree Fattens 
College Bureaucracy—And Tuition, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2012, 10:30 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873233168045781614907160428
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The available data on faculty size are, unfortunately, nearly im-
possible to parse. U.S. News and World Report changed its report-
ing during the period beginning in 1990, initially reporting “faculty 
size” as a number but subsequently switching to crude student-fac-
ulty ratios. Moreover, is it unclear what persons are included in ei-
ther measure of faculty. Are a medical school’s clinical faculty in-
cluded? What about adjunct professors, graduate students, teaching 
assistants, and so forth? Sadly, the dearth of clarity means that any 
statement on my part about the impact of endowment size on faculty 
size would be nothing more than speculation. Maybe there has been 
such an impact.  Maybe not. And I similarly cannot say anything 
definitive about the impact of endowment size on physical plant, 
faculty salaries, or administrative staff size (although I confess to 
having strong suspicions that each of these has indeed been posi-
tively impacted).  
But I can say something definitive about administrative remu-
neration: it has almost certainly been a beneficiary of increased en-
dowment size, at least if chief executive compensation is any 
guide.147 Such compensation at the top-twenty private universities 
increased 680.83% from 1990 to 2013, from an average of $213,704 
to an average of $1,668,667.148 This works out to an annualized rate 




                                                                                                             
14; Paul F. Campos, The Real Reason College Costs So Much, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 
4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/opinion/sunday/the-real-reason-
college-tuition-costs-so-much.html. But see Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, College 
Tuition is Getting More Expensive. Here’s Who’s Actually to Blame., WASH. POST 
(Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/07
/college-tuition-is-getting-more-expensive-heres-whos-actually-to-blame/ (argu-
ing that the rise in the “professional staff” may be outweighing the size—and 
cost—of the administrative staff). 
 147 See infra Table 8. 
 148 See infra Table 8. This applies to those twenty schools other than 
Georgetown, for which data was either available in both years or was available 
for at least relatively contemporaneous years. See id. 
 149 Compare infra Table 8, with CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 124 (an-
nualized inflation rate is 2.4%). 

























































$640,295 +  
454,887 = 
$1,095,182 
                                                                                                             
150 Data on chief executive compensation was obtained from: Brian O’Leary & 
Joshua Hatch, Executive Compensation at Private and Public Colleges, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 4, 2016), http://chronicle.com/interactives/executive-com-
pensation#id=table_private_2013 (phrase searched is as follows: “In 2013, which 
private-college leaders earned the highest total compensation in the U.S.?”). I lim-
ited the comparison of chief executive compensation to the 15 chief executives at 
those private universities for which I was able to find compensation information 
for both years. See id. The figures included in Table 8 denote each executive’s 
total compensation for 2013 as calculated by The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
including base pay, bonus pay, nontaxable compensation, other compensation, 
and deferred compensation set aside. 






































































My objective in this analysis is not to criticize private university 
chief executive compensation. Nonetheless, I want to make two 
points about such compensation. First, the mere fact that such com-
pensation may be lower than the compensation of many chief exec-
utives in the private sector does not mean that it is not excessive.151 
                                                                                                             
 151 See Jaeah Lee & Maggie Severns, Charts: When College Presidents Are 
Paid Like CEOs, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 5, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.moth-
erjones.com/politics/2013/09/charts-college-presidents-overpaid-pay (comparing 
college and university faculty and executive pay). See generally Brian Galle & 
David I. Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Problem: Evidence from 
U.S. Colleges and Universities, 94 B.U.L. REV. 1881, 1895–1904 (2014) (arguing 
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Private sector compensation only provides a relevant comparison for 
private university chief executives with the ability and the desire to 
relocate to the private sector.152 Given that such relocations are ex-
tremely rare, it seems implausible that very many private university 
chief executives have that ability or desire. Second, and far more 
importantly, the fact that private university chief executive compen-
sation is determined by competition between various universities 
does not mean that it is not, in an important sense, excessive.153 A 
numerical example will illustrate why. 
Suppose that Bob is a potential university chief executive who 
would command a salary of $500,000 in the private sector and who 
places a value of $200,000 plus a penny on being in academia. So 
long as a university offers Bob $300,000 of compensation, Bob will 
become or remain an academic. This is true regardless of Bob’s ac-
tual value to academia. Nonetheless, for purposes of this illustration, 
assume that Bob’s value as a university administrator, excluding his 
value as a raiser of endowed funds, is exactly $300,000. In that case, 
in a world without endowments, any university should be willing to 
pay Bob $300,000 of compensation, and Bob should happily accept 
such amount. 
Now suppose that Bob has the additional skill of being a rela-
tively efficient raiser of endowed funds. Indeed, suppose he is capa-
                                                                                                             
that constraints on nonprofit manager pay may be even weaker than such con-
straints in the for-profit sector). 
 152 See Lee & Severns, supra note 151 (“Where the networks of corporate di-
rectors and trustees are dense and overlapping, as CEO compensation in the cor-
porate sector increases, a similar logic may well be applied to CEO compensation 
in private universities.”). But see Galle & Walker, supra note 151, at 1894 (“Of 
course, nonprofit executives must be paid a competitive wage. The difficulty lies 
in distinguishing between competitive compensation, which is allowed, and ‘ex-
cess benefit transactions’ that represent forbidden private inurement.”). 
 153 Sam Sanders, America’s Highest-Paid Private-University President Made 
$7.1 Million In 2012, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 8, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://
www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/12/08/369400033/americas-highest-paid-
private-university-president-made-7-1-million-in-2012 (“[L]egitimate questions 
can be raised about at what point does compensation press the bounds of appro-
priateness, given the types of institutions [college presidents] lead, and the ex-
emptions they’re afforded under the federal tax code[.]”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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ble of raising incremental endowed funds that in turn allow the uni-
versity to increase its annual spending by $50,000.154 Bob’s univer-
sity would like to reap the benefit of this windfall. But so would 
every other university. Thus, when the dust settles, some university 
will likely offer Bob compensation of just under $350,000; Bob’s 
raise reflects his incremental fund-raising prowess. But, note that 
this means that Bob, rather than his university, reaps the entire value 
of the incremental funds flowing into the endowment.155 
This argument extends far beyond the office of chief executive. 
For example, the presence of certain faculty members at a university 
may lead to enhanced endowment fundraising.156 The presence of 
larger administrative staffs may lead to enhanced endowment fund-
raising.157 The presence of a nicer football stadium may lead to en-
hanced endowment fundraising.158 In the first case, the relevant fac-
ulty members will, in the limit, enjoy increases in their compensa-
tion that completely swallow up their “contribution” to the endow-
ment.159 In the second case, the administrative staff will, in the limit, 
see an increase in its budget that completely swallows up its “con-
tribution” to the endowment.160 And in the third case, the nicer foot-
ball stadium will be built so long as the cost is at least one penny 
less than the amount it “adds” to the endowment.161 
                                                                                                             
 154 For example, based solely on his charisma, Bob might be able to raise $1 
million more of endowed funds than would the typical university president. In 
that case, if Bob’s university endowment has a 5% payout rate, Bob would provide 
the university with approximately an additional $50,000 per year to spend. 
 155 Given that money is fungible, this will be true no matter how the endowed 
funds are restricted. 
 156 See, e.g., New Professorship Honors Longtime Pharmaceutical Re-
searcher, KU NEWS (Apr. 13, 2015), http://news.ku.edu/2015/04/13/new-profes-
sorship-honors-longtime-pharmaceutical-researcher. 
 157 See, e.g., Emily Lane, LSU Tables Plan to Create Vice President to Over-
see Fundraising Orgs, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 19, 2015, 6:50 PM), http://
www.nola.com/news/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2015/03/lsu_foundation_moret_sear
ch.html. 
 158 See, e.g., Riley Blevins, Ole Miss AD Ross Bjork Agrees to 4-Year Exten-
sion, THE CLARION-LEDGER (Apr. 17, 2015, 11:19 AM), http://www.clarion-
ledger.com/story/olemisssports/2015/04/17/ole-miss-ad-ross-bjork-agrees-to-4-
year-extension/25934979/. 
 159 See, e.g., KU NEWS, supra note 156. 
 160 See, e.g., Lane, supra note 157. 
 161 See, e.g., id. 
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I am enough of a capitalist that I generally have no particular 
objection to the earning of economic rents.162 But these are artifi-
cially created rents: from a societal perspective, they are nothing 
more than excessive payments.163 In each and every case, the pay-
ment is financed by a diversion of what should have been federal tax 
revenue.164 That is, scarce money that would otherwise have been 
available to the federal government to pursue public goals will in-
stead find its way into a private university endowment, where it will 
effectively be earmarked to pay a perpetual rent to someone (or 
something) at the university.165 Importantly, none of the diverted tax 
revenue will provide any educational benefit to the university’s stu-
dents.166 Thus, as shown in Table 2.6 (which modifies prior Table 
2.4), it is possible that a tax deductible contribution to a private uni-
versity endowment will lead not only to a lower level of aggregate 





(Potential Cash  
Contribution) 
Grant of  
Federal  
Revenue to 




used to Fund 
Education 
Current Non-Education 
Spending Controlled by  
Federal Government 
$27 million $27 million 
Current Education Spending 
Controlled by Federal  
Government 
$3 million $0 
                                                                                                             
 162 See generally Robert H. Wessel, A Note on Economic Rent, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1221, 1222 (1967) (defining “economic rent” and the “Paretian rent” con-
cept). 
 163 See generally Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291–303 (1974); Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei 
Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?, 83 
AM. ECON. REV. 409, 409–14 (1993). 
 164 See supra Part III. 
 165 See id. 
 166 See supra Part III–IV. 
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NPV of Future Education 
and Non-Education 
 Spending Controlled by 
Federal Government 
$7 million $0 
NPV of Future Rents Paid to 
Providers of Private  
University Educations 
$0 $7.143 million 
 
So, which is it? Do private university endowments finance trans-
fers to students that precisely offset any transfers such students 
would receive if such students instead attended public universities? 
Or do they merely finance rents unrelated to the quality of educa-
tion? I tend to think they do some of both, but that the mix has 
changed dramatically over time. Thus, if one goes back far enough 
in time, to the halcyon days when university administrators devoted 
themselves to the educational mission rather than to fundraising, en-
dowment dollars almost surely primarily funded the educational 
mission.167 But then private university administration evolved to 
where it became largely synonymous with fundraising.168 In that 
world, which is the current world, newly-raised endowed funds will 
almost surely fund anything and everything except the educational 
mission.169 
                                                                                                             
 167 See, e.g., Benjamin Ginsburg, Administrators Ate My Tuition, WASH. 
MONTHLY (Sept./Oct. 2011), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/sept
emberoctober_2011/features/administrators_ate_my_tuition031641.php?page=
all (describing the change in university administrators’ view of their role, shifting 
from a view “that the purpose of a university [is] the promotion of education and 
research” to a “view [that] management [is] an end in and of itself.”). 
 168 See, e.g., id.; Jon Marcus, New Analysis Shows Problematic Boom in 
Higher Ed Administrators, THE NEW ENG. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING 
(Feb. 6, 2014), http://necir.org/2014/02/06/new-analysis-shows-problematic-
boom-in-higher-ed-administrators/. 
 169 A number of scholars have recently written on the subject of the possibility 
of reforming the taxation of private university endowments. See generally, e.g., 
Waldeck, supra note 115. Waldeck focuses on what she terms “excessively large” 
endowments, measured on the basis of endowment per full-time student, and 
seeks primarily to spur such excessively large endowments to stem the rise in 
tuition. See id. at 1799, 1801–03. While she makes no serious proposals as to the 
treatment of endowments that are currently excessive, she does offer very creative 
proposals that would help prevent endowments from becoming more excessive in 
the future. See generally id. at 1812–22. To wit, she would limit the tax deduction 
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V. CONCLUSION 
I have demonstrated that financing higher education in part by 
means of tax deductible donations to educational endowments is un-
sound from a theoretical standpoint: the tax preference not only al-
lows private donors to control the disposition of funds that the fed-
eral government would otherwise control, but also actually reduces 
the aggregate amount of funds available to satisfy all public goals.170 
No appreciable public benefits are obtained in exchange for the loss 
of control—much flexibility is sacrificed.171 And obviously, no pub-
lic benefit can accrue from reducing the funds available to satisfy 
public goals. Finally, when the would-be public funds are diverted 
to private endowments, those funds will, to a great extent, cease to 
be used to satisfy any public goal at all.172 Rather, they will be fur-
ther diverted to the pockets of individuals who are adept at attracting 
such funds.173 
I have also demonstrated that real world evidence174 seems to 
supports the theory. The evidence suggests that increased size of pri-
vate university endowments has not led to more higher education, to 
cheaper higher education, or to better higher education.175 On the 
other hand, the evidence does suggest that the increased size of pri-
vate university endowments has led to higher levels of remuneration 
for private university chief executive officers.176 
In the best of all possible worlds, the federal government could 
and probably should respond to these observations with some dra-
matic action such as the confiscation of all private university endow-
                                                                                                             
in the case of gifts that are targeted at the purchase or construction of depreciable 
assets (such assets do not necessarily improve the quantity or quality of education, 
but almost always add to its cost). See id. at 1818–19. In addition, she would deny 
a deduction for any gift that does not specify that it must be spent within twenty-
five years. See id. at 1819. For the other side of the coin, Cowan argues in favor 
of the status quo for no better reason than that it is, well, the status quo. Cf. Cowan, 
supra note 31, at 551–52. 
 170 See supra Part III. 
 171 See id.. 
 172 See supra Part IV. 
 173 See id. 
 174 See id. 
 175 See id. 
 176 See id. 
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ments: after all, such endowments contain nothing more than di-
verted federal tax revenue.177 But, our Constitution would likely 
prohibit such action.178 And in any event, my focus here has been 
not so much on the existence of endowments, but rather on their 
ability to grow by means of attracting new gifts that are tax deduct-
ible to the donors. 
Thus, my policy prescription is that the federal government 
should, at a minimum, repeal the I.R.C. § 170 deduction for any gift 
that prohibits the donee institution from immediately spending such 
gift.179 Given the vagaries of budgeting, an institution cannot, real-
istically speaking, immediately spend every gift, at least not in a 
manner that would benefit students and the public at large. But noth-
ing should prevent the institution from doing so, provided that 
within such institution’s judgment, its mission would best be served 
by such immediate deployment.180 In any event, this change to the 
I.R.C. § 170 deduction would encourage donors to replace problem-
atic larger one-time gifts with smaller much less problematic annual 
gifts. And that would represent a win for higher education. 
                                                                                                             
 177 See supra Part III. 
 178 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 5 (“[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”); JOHN BOURDEAU ET AL., 26 AM. JUR. 2D 
EMINENT DOMAIN § 6 (Westlaw 2017). 
 179 Federal income tax law does feature some, albeit very limited, restrictions 
on deductions for donor-restricted gifts. See generally Alan F. Rothschild, Jr., 
How Donors May—And May Not—Exercise Control of Charitable Gifts, 16 
TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 110, 110–15 (2004). 
 180 As an aside, state law does currently permit the release or modification of 
donor restrictions on endowment funds under certain limited circumstances. See 
generally Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform 
Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1279–1332 
(2007). 
